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REGULATORY CONTRARIANS*
BRETT MCDONNELL & DANIEL SCHWARCZ**

This Article explores the role that "regulatorycontrarians"can play in
promoting more adaptive financial regulation. Such contrarians have
several distinguishingfeatures. First, they possess persuasive authority
by virtue of their position, access to media and officials, or speaking
engagements and reports. Second, they are affiliated with, and enjoy
privileged access to, a regulatory entity but are nonetheless
independent, as reflected in their budget, staffing, and/or priorities.
Finally, they are tasked with studying the regulatory process, policy
positions, and the regulated market and in some way reporting on
deficiencies and potential improvements. The Article argues that
regulatory contrarianscan modestly limit the risk that regulators will
fail to adapt to newly emerging and ever-shifting financial risks, by
eitherfailing to enact new rules or failing to modify or repeal old rules.
Despite this potential, the Article argues that, in the domain offinancial
regulation, contrariansare used only in a small subset of the instances
where they can provide value. Currently, financial regulatory
contrariansfit into four basic categories: (1) Ombudsman Contrarians,
(2) Consumer Representative Contrarians, (3) Investigative
Contrarians,and (4) Research Contrarians.Whereas the first two types
of contrariansare limited in their subject area to consumer protection
and services, the latter two types of contrarians are limited in their
methodological scope. Finally, the Article argues that the Dodd-Frank
Act holds the potential to improve financial regulation by transcending
historicallimitationsembedded in the traditionalcategories of financial
regulatory contrarians.
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INTRODUCTION

Multiple, interacting forces precipitated the global financial crisis
of 2008. But the failure of regulators to curb systemic risk in the
shadow banking sector or to limit consumer abuses in mortgage
markets are among the most troubling contributors to the crisis.
Financial regulators enjoyed both substantial statutory authority to
address these problems and meaningful warnings from the academic
community of the need to do so.2 These causes of the crisis were
1. For an excellent overview of the role of these two factors in the financial crisis, see
generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, SHADOw BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2010) [hereinafter SHADOW BANKING], available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf;
COMM'N, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS (2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/
cdnmedialfcic-reports/2010-0407-PSR-_TheMortgageCrisis.pdf.
2. See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Pat A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (warning of the
need to more effectively regulate the mortgage market); Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation
When "Banks" and "Banking" Are Not the Same, 10 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 106
(1994) (explaining the need for better regulation of nonbank entities that compete with
banks for greater market share); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Transformation of the U.S.
FinancialServices Industry, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (providing a pre-crisis warning of the
need to better regulate large financial conglomerates). One of the more prominent law
review articles in recent times argued that federal banking agencies had the authority to
protect consumers from "unsafe" credit but did not have the motivation to do so because
they were primarily motivated by protecting the safety and soundness of banks. See, e.g.,
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86-95
(2008). Regulatory authority prior to financial reform with respect to the shadow banking
system is harder to describe, largely because the shadow banking system specifically
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consequently not merely a product of an inadequate statutory regime,
but just as much (if not more) a product of the failure of regulators to
accomplish their prescribed goals.3
Now that the riskiness of shadow banking and mortgage abuses
have become clear, it is hardly surprising that reform efforts have
sought to more effectively regulate these activities. But financial
markets are constantly changing and generating new and
unanticipated risks, ensuring that the next financial crisis will be
different than the previous one. Indeed, much financial innovation is
specifically driven by the inevitable quest of the financial sector to
avoid regulation and the compliance costs that come along with it.4 In
that sense, it is not merely a possibility-but a near certainty-that
new financial risks will emerge that cannot be specifically targeted in
legislation. For that reason, law will only have a fighting chance to
defer and moderate the next financial crisis if regulators are entrusted
with broad authority to limit newly emerging, but previously
unanticipated, risks.
The financial crisis of 2008 thus leaves us with apparently
conflicting lessons. On one hand, regulators failed to use authority
they clearly possessed to limit identified risks, but on the other hand
law has no choice but to rely on such regulators to anticipate and
counteract newly emerging financial risks. This diagnosis suggests
deep limits in the capacity of law and regulation to prevent future
evolved to evade regulatory restrictions on banking. See SHADOW BANKING, supra note 1,
at 10-14. But it was hardly the case that regulators possessed no authority to limit the risks
of shadow banking. For instance, some have argued that the SEC's failure to regulate
money market accounts appropriately by requiring mark-to-market accounting
contributed to the financial crisis. See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money
Market Funds, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 1155, 1181-90 (arguing that the SEC's revisions to its
regulations of money market funds fail to solve, and even exacerbate, this underlying
problem). Another failure of financial regulators to exercise their regulatory authority
pre-crisis involved the SEC's Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, which supervised
investment banks on a consolidated basis. The SEC inspector general recognized serious
problems in the operation of this program. See SEC INSPECTOR GEN., SEC's OVERSIGHT
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES 5 (2008), available at http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-b.pdf.
3. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT, at xvii (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic finalreportfull.pdf ("We conclude that the financial crisis was avoidable"
and was "the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer
models gone haywire."); id. at xviii ("Yet we do not accept the view that regulators lacked
the power to protect the financial system. They had ample power in many arenas and they
chose not to use it.").
4. See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored FinancialServices Industry:
An ExploratoryEssay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 321 (1999).
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financial crises. At the same time, though, it suggests that a core
challenge facing financial regulation is to devise mechanisms that can
mitigate the risk that regulators will not evolve as fast as the
marketplaces they are regulating. Making matters yet more
complicated, the regulatory implications of an evolving marketplace
are not unidirectional. Whereas some forms of market evolution
demand new regulations or enforcement strategies, other forms of
market evolution necessitate regulatory adaptation in the opposite
direction, counseling the repeal or decreased enforcement of
regulations that have gone too far or become outdated.
Various important suggestions for overcoming agency inaction in
the face of financial market change have already begun to emerge.
The most notable of these, which is incorporated in the Dodd-Frank
Act, proposed creating an independent agency dedicated to consumer
protection in the arena of credit.' Other proposals for promoting
agency responsiveness to change include limiting the capacity of
financial institutions to choose their regulators,6 promoting
competition among multiple enforcers of regulation,' and improving
the training and resources of financial regulators.'
This Article describes an additional approach to taming the risk
that regulators will fail to invoke their authority to address newly
emerging financial risks or more generally to modify existing
regulatory schemes when modification is warranted. In particular, it
suggests charging an entity that is affiliated with, but independent of,
5. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 98-100 (proposing the creation of a new
consumer agency that would have broad rulemaking and enforcement authority to
regulate consumer financial products).
6. See, e.g., Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office
of Thrift Supervision and the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1779-80 (2011);
Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization:The Result of Deregulation
and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 517-23 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation: Against Regulatory
Competition in Insurance,94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1727-28 (2009).
7. See Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in Financial
Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279, 306-09 (2009); Amanda M. Rose, The
MultienforcerApproach to Securities FraudDeterrence:A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2173, 2200-29 (2010) (discussing the use of multiple enforcers to combat
underdeterrence of security fraud); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where Was
the SEC When the Mutual Fund Scandal Happened?, LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 46,
46, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review coffeemar
apr04.msp (suggesting that regulatory competition by the New York attorney general with
the SEC helped stem various abuses in the mutual fund industry).
8. Erik F. Gerding, Bubbles, Law, and Regulation 9 (May. 19, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (draft on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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a financial regulator with the task of monitoring that regulator and
the regulated marketplace and publicly suggesting new initiatives or
potential structural or personnel changes. Although we are the first to
label such entities "regulatory contrarians," they are not uncommon
in the regulatory state. Various ombudsmen have evolved to take on
the role of a regulatory contrarian, such as the Taxpayer Advocate
Service of the Internal Revenue Service.' Some regulators run
consumer participation programs that resemble regulatory
contrarians.o For instance, the National Association of Insurance
twenty
consumer
appoints
approximately
Commissioners
representatives." And it is quite common for agencies to have
affiliated inspectors general or research programs that can also be
viewed as regulatory contrarians.12 There are also quasi-contrarian
strategies that have some but not all of the elements by which we
define contrarians. The Government Accountability Office-which
does not qualify as a contrarian because it is not affiliated with a
specific agency-is a prime example."
Despite the pervasiveness of contrarians in the current
regulatory state, their commonalities have not been fully appreciated
in the existing literature.14 Partially for this reason, the potential of
9. See generally infra Part III.A (discussing the means of persuasion that the
Taxpayer Advocate Service employs to counter IRS inaction).
10. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 62-64 (2011) (exploring the role that public
advocates can play in limiting the risk of regulatory capture).
11. See generally infra Part III.B (describing successful efforts of the NAIC's
consumer representatives to combat regulatory inaction).
12. See generally infra Part III.C-D (describing the capacity of inspectors general and
"research contrarians" in combating regulatory inaction).
13. See infra Part III.E.
14. There are two related literatures. First, there is a robust literature in the
administrative law context aimed at countering regulatory inaction. Several contributions
to this literature focus on empowering a single agency with countering such inaction. See
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1277-80 (2006); Glen Staszewski, The FederalInaction Committee,
59 EMORY L.J. 369, 372 (2009). These proposals, however, primarily focus on the prospect
that an agency will make a specific decision not to act in the face of clear, existing statutory
authority, a prospect reflected in the EPA's approach to regulating carbon. See id. at 393
("Congress should enact a statute that creates a new, independent administrative agency
to oversee, monitor, and evaluate decisions by Executive Branch agencies not to
implement their existing statutory authority."). By contrast, our focus is on failure to act
due to market adaptation, which typically involves failure to act coupled with failure to
realize that one is failing to act. The second set of related literatures examines specific
entities that we identify as contrarians. For instance, there is a substantial literature on
inspectors general. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 1-8 (1993); Michael R. Bromwich,
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contrarians to promote regulatory adaptation to market change has
been cabined to relatively narrow domains, at least in the financial
realm." For instance, both ombudsman contrarians and consumer
contrarians are typically envisioned to empower consumers and keep
regulators abreast of the consumer experience. 6 Their usefulness is
consequently tethered to the consumer-protection context. By
contrast, the scope of investigative and research contrarians is
typically constrained to domains in which they enjoy particular
methodological competence: inspectors general are generally limited
to investigating past instances of misconduct or waste, and research
contrarians produce academic papers that only broadly and
haphazardly inform day-to-day regulatory policy." In sum, the
capacity of existing contrarians to induce proactive financial
regulation has historically been limited to specific pockets of
regulatory activities.
Financial reform as outlined in the Dodd-Frank Act ("DoddFrank" or "the Act")1 s substantially expands the role of regulatory
contrarians. In fact, one of the most distinctive structural
characteristics of Dodd-Frank is its embrace of contrarian and quasicontrarian strategies. The Act not only contains examples of all the
types of contrarian and quasi-contrarian mechanisms identified in this
Article, but it also dramatically expands on the historical limitations
of regulatory contrarians. In particular, Dodd-Frank jettisons the
subject-matter boundaries of prior financial contrarians, pushing
contrarian institutions into the realm of systemic and prudential risk
Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027, 2027-28
(1998). Similarly, there is a substantial literature on ombudsman organizations, although
this literature tends to focus less on their role as a contrarian. See, e.g., WENDY GINSBERG
& FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34606, FEDERAL COMPLAINTHANDLING, OMBUDSMAN, AND ADVOCACY OFFICES 1-5 (2009), available at http://assets
.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34606 20090804.pdf. These literatures, however, typically fail to link
the similar roles played by inspectors general, consumer advocates, ombudsmen, and
research contrarians.
15. It may be that regulatory contrarians currently, or historically, have figured more
prominently in other regulatory domains, particularly environmental regulation. For
instance, the Environmental Protection Agency public liaison is authorized to investigate
cases where it suspects improper agency action. See GINSBERG & KAISER, supra note 14,
at 14.
16. See infra Part III.A-B.
17. See generally infra Part III.C-D (describing the functions of inspectors general
and research contrarians).
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
2011)).
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regulation. The Act also transcends various methodological
restrictions of contrarians, directing "investigative" contrarians to be
more proactive and "academic" contrarians to be more policy
oriented. In sum, Congress seems to have understood both that it
lacked the understanding to fully anticipate and draft all needed new
rules, and also that contrarian institutions can improve the capacity of
regulators to adapt to changing market conditions and structures. Of
course, these strategies will certainly not eliminate the impediments
to effective regulatory adaptation, but they may marginally limit
them, which is still an important result.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing in
broad brush strokes the impediments that regulators face in adapting
to ever-changing financial markets. Part II offers a definition of
contrarians and speculates how regulatory contrarians might
counteract the difficulties reviewed in Part I. Part III describes the
variants of regulatory contrarians that currently exist in financial
regulation, offering a four-part typology. Finally, Part IV closes by
exploring the ways in which financial reform, in Dodd-Frank and
elsewhere, extends the use of contrarians to attempt to more broadly
limit the risks of regulatory inaction. It also considers several
preliminary lessons that the older generation of financial regulatory
contrarians may offer for the new generation.
I. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND ADAPTATION

All regulators must adapt to change in order to remain
effective. 19 But in many ways, adaptation is particularly important for
financial regulators.20 The markets and firms that financial regulators
19. The need for such adaptation figures particularly prominently in the academic
literature on environmental regulation. See generally Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011) (analyzing the
"information problems" affecting adaptive management strategies). Of course, adaptation
in the environmental context presents many of its own challenges, as regulators must
adjust to the complexities and uncertainties of the underlying ecosystem. See J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and the Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59,97-98 (2010).
20. For some discussions of agency inaction in the context of financial regulation, see
Coffee, supra note 7, at 46; Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices
About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 15961612 (2006); Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 11, 17-18 (2006). For an argument that the U.S. financial regulatory
system has not adequately adapted to the blurring of traditional categories of financial
institutions, see Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing FinancialRegulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1,
16-28 (2010).
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oversee are constantly shifting, often in ways that are difficult to
observe or predict. Moreover, the increasing complexity and
interconnectedness of modern financial markets means that
apparently unrelated changes can have unforeseeable and synergistic
impacts on the financial system as a whole.21 For these reasons,
market change can result in regulators operating under inappropriate
laws or assumptions. Often, this is a product of their failure to enact
new rules. But regulators' failure to evolve can also involve the
continuation of rules or policies that have become ineffective or
counterproductive in light of market change, or that were simply
mistakes in the first place.22
Unfortunately, financial regulators face various impediments to
effectively evolving along with the markets they regulate. 23 This Part
provides a broad overview of these difficulties. Section A focuses on
the prospect that even properly motivated regulators may fail to
appropriately adapt to change due to mistakes, ignoring some market
21. See Steven Schwarcz & Iman Anabtawi, Regulating Systemic Risk, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1670017 (exploring how "two otherwise independent
correlations can combine to transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic
crises").
22. A prime potential candidate here might be the continuation of housing agencies
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. One of us has elsewhere called for the elimination
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See Brett H. McDonnell, Don't Panic! Defending
Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis 46-47 (Minn. Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 11-09, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=1753760. It is hotly debated how much of a role these government-sponsored
entities played in causing the financial crisis. Some argue they played at most a small role.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Slump Goes On: Why?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Sept. 30, 2010, at 57, 58, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/sep/30/
slump-goes-why/. Others argue that their role was significant. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan,
Reviewing Krugman, CHI. BOOTH BLOG: FAULT LINES (Sept. 16, 2010), http://forums
.chicagobooth.edu/faultlines?entry=24. The congressional panel on the causes of the crisis
split by political party over the role of these entities. See Kevin Drawbaugh & Dave
Clarke, Flawed Report Seen from U.S. Financial Crisis Panel, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/11/idlNIndia-54087320110111. Still, even if one does
not believe these entities were a major cause of the crisis, their original goal of developing
a securitization market for mortgages has long-since been achieved, and private actors are
now quite actively fulfilling that role. Another, less high-profile, illustration of regulators'
failure to evolve by continuing ineffective or outdated policies involves insurance
regulators' retention of formulaic reserve requirements for life insurers. See Daniel
Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1707, 1765-66 (2010).
23. There is substantial literature within the administrative law field documenting
agency ossification and inaction more generally. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Why
Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of JudicialReview, 70 OHIO ST.
L.J. 251, 297-307 (2009) (discussing the impact of judicial review on agency ossification).
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changes while exaggerating others. Section B, by contrast, describes
the limited incentives that regulators may have to evolve with
regulated marketplaces. Throughout, this Part emphasizes that many
of the difficulties that financial regulators face in adapting to change
cut across different types of financial regulation. Whether they are
seeking to protect consumers or investors on the one hand, or seeking
to limit externalities by preserving firm or systemic stability on the
other, many cognitive failures and incentive distortions create similar
obstacles to change. But the relative importance of cognitive failures
versus incentive distortions may differ for consumer protection as
opposed to systemic risk, with regulatory capture being a more
pronounced problem for consumer protection and cognitive errors a
more pronounced problem for systemic risk.
A.

Regulators and Cognitive Failures
Like all individuals, regulators are subject to various heuristics
and biases that produce predictable and systematic errors.24 Several
heuristics and biases are particularly likely to interfere with financial
regulators' adaptation to market change. First, various biases may
undermine regulatory efforts by distorting regulators' perceptions of
risks in the markets they regulate. It is well known that the perception
of risk is impacted by the cognitive availability of the underlying risks,
with individuals tending to place undue weight on relatively recent
24. The foundational work in behavioral economics is Tversky and Kahneman's initial
discussion of prospect theory. See generally PETER A. DIAMOND ET AL., BEHAVIORAL

ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2007) (providing a survey of recent scholarship on
behavioral economics and its applications); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (providing an introduction to the

field of behavioral finance and its focus on the challenges to efficient markets based on
human fallibility); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (discussing the "cognitive biases that stem
from reliance on judgmental heuristics"). Behavioral economics has been applied to the
analysis of law in the new field of behavioral law and economics. See generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) (providing a survey of recent
scholarship on behavioral economics and its application to the law). Much of the initial
work applying behavioral research in the legal domain emphasized that markets do not
work as well as assumed by law and economics scholars, thus leaving greater room for
potentially efficient regulatory interventions. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (exploring
positive, prescriptive, and normative applications of behavioral economics to the law).
More recent work, though, emphasizes that regulators are people, too, and hence subject
to the same sorts of heuristics and biases that limit the efficiency of markets. See Stephen
J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5
(2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 553-54 (2002).
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and salient events and tending to underappreciate less salient and
recent risks? 5 Social amplification of risk can exacerbate this bias as
media report and reflect the most extreme, recent, and "newsworthy"
risks.26
Even though experts are generally less susceptible to these biases
than lay people,27 distortions in risk perceptions can nonetheless
undermine financial regulators' adaptation to changing market
conditions. This is most obvious in the context of prudential and
systemic risk regulation. Financial regulation has historically been
marked by a strikingly procyclical pattern of regulation in which risks
are downplayed when times are good and overemphasized during
periods of crisis? This tendency to procyclical enforcement contrasts
starkly with the countercyclical pattern that ought to characterize
governmental regulation of systemic risk.29 An important explanation
for this pattern is simply that financial risks are not cognitively
available during the peak of a credit cycle, but are obviously both
salient and immediate during times of financial crisis. Broad financial
downturns also tend to result in the revelation of individual scandals,
creating a perceived pattern.3 0 Social amplification of risk likely
exacerbates these patterns.
Regulators' distorted perceptions of risk can also undermine
their capacity to adapt to new consumer protection challenges.
Regulators often set their consumer protection priorities based on
consumer complaint patterns and recent headlines.32 Yet many
25. See generally THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (compiling
twenty-five years of research on risk perception).
26. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2007) (providing an
extensive discussion of how risk perception can affect regulation); THE SOCIAL
AMPLIFICATION OF RISK (Paul Slovic et al. eds., 2003) (reviewing the ways in which mass
media and social communication affect human risk perception).
27. See Cass Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1123-24 (2002)
(book review) (arguing in favor of a technocratic view of regulation because experts are
less susceptible to distortions in risk perception than lay people).
28. See JACK GUTTENTAG & RICHARD HERRING, DISASTER MYOPIA IN
INTERNATIONAL BANKING 3-4 (1986); Gerding, supra note 8, at 4-5.
29. See infra Part II (discussing how regulatory contrarians could help agencies
maintain their vigilance by pointing out issues and potential problems that are not
receiving enough attention by that agency).
30. See Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of CorporateLaw, 25 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 8-9 (2008).
31. Id. at 9.
32. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of
the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REv. 735,
770-79 (2009). See generally KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE (1998) (outlining the important role that media
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consumer protection problems develop and persist in competitive
marketplaces precisely because they are neither observable to
consumers nor salacious enough to generate headlines.33 At the same
time, when consumer protection issues do result in scandal, regulators
may over-respond, channeling their energies into problems that do
not exist and misallocating scarce resources.
A second group of biases may impede effective adaptation to
change by causing financial regulators to have undue confidence in
their regulatory approaches and to be overly dismissive of the need to
adjust in the face of market changes. Overconfidence in one's abilities
to identify problems and prescribe solutions is a persistent feature of
human existence, 34 and it is particularly prevalent among "experts,"
such as those who tend to drive regulatory policy.35 Confirmation bias
exacerbates the problem: once regulators have put rules on the books,
they will tend to interpret ambiguous evidence in a manner suggesting
the effectiveness of their choices. 6 So too does groupthink.3 7 In most
cases, the leadership of agencies will be a cohesive group, with people
selected for leadership positions because of their relationship with
and/or shared perspective with the agency head. In this context,
regulators will tend to gravitate to shared ideas, even when the
group's preexisting perspectives do not necessarily entail those
ideas.38 Once this happens, group members will tend not to challenge
the accepted notions of the group. Such groupthink can interact with
and intensify confirmation bias, making it very hard for an agency to
escape from the mindset that led to its current regulatory choices.
This cluster of biases will systematically tend to produce
excessive inaction in the face of market change.39 The most recent and
salient example of this is the Federal Reserve under chairman Alan
Greenspan, which confidently endorsed limited systemic and
attention, particularly in the form of headlines, has often played in setting the consumer
protection agenda of insurance regulators).
33. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2011) (manuscript at 6 n.13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1687909.
34. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 24, at 28-29; Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24,
at 579.
35. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 579.
36. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 24, at 30.
37. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, VIcrIMs OF GROUPTHINK (1972) (reviewing the
effects of groupthink on twentieth-century foreign-policy decisions).
38. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 541-43 (2002).
39. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 560-61.
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prudential risk regulations despite dramatic increases in risk
throughout the early and mid-2000s.4 Although disentangling
political ideology from cognitive bias in this context is difficult, it
seems clear in retrospect that overconfidence, confirmation bias, and
groupthink at least contributed to push the laissez-faire inclinations of
the Federal Reserve toward excessive disregard of newly emerging
systemic and prudential risks. 41 The problem may be even more
severe in the consumer protection context, which is particularly
susceptible to ideological precommitments that may produce
confirmation bias.4 2 On one hand, consumer protection agencies may
attract employees who tend to see the industry with jaded eyes and
extensive regulation with overly rose-colored glasses. On the other
hand, those who embrace free-market ideologies may be particularly
prone to interpreting all consumer protection issues through a lens
focused on consumer autonomy and healthy competition.
Bounded rationality-the cognitive limits of real individuals, as
opposed to the unlimited cognitive powers of the rational actor
featured in economic models 43-- can undermine regulatory adaptation
even when it does not produce specific heuristics or biases."
Particularly in the United States, rationality is likely to be
asymmetrically bounded for financial regulators as compared with
financial market participants. Put more bluntly, the best and the
brightest are more likely to go into the private sector than into
40. See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME
VIRUS (2011) (providing an overview of the subprime crisis and, in particular, the role of
federal regulators in sanctioning risky market practices).
41. See id.; see also Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How
Conceptual Biases in Complex OrganizationsContributedto the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 825-28 (2009) (arguing that "intellectual hazard"-or the tendency
of behavioral biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex
organizations-contributed to the errors of the Federal Reserve in ignoring the housing
bubble by promoting easy credit, relying on the self-interest of lending institutions to
check risk-taking, and endorsing the idea of a "great moderation").
42. Here, too, the approach of the Federal Reserve under Greenspan to subprime
mortgages constitutes an important example.
43. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 1-17 (2008)
(distinguishing between "humans" and "econs").
44. Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in MODELS OF MAN,
SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN
A SOCIAL SETTING 241, 241-60 (1957) (proposing a model of human rationality that is
more consistent with the level of access to information and computational powers of real
human beings than is found in the traditional model of "economic man"); Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1449-50 (2003) (integrating psychological findings about intuitions and
choice into the model of reasoning heuristics found in the author's previous work).
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government.45 That's where the money and prestige are. This fact
makes it particularly difficult for regulators to keep up with market
change, as much financial innovation is specifically designed to
exploit regulatory loopholes. Regulated financial firms constantly
seek to avoid the costs of regulation through legal arbitrage, the
process of characterizing and/or designing financial products or
services so that they trigger the fewest regulatory costs." The
multisectored nature of American financial regulation makes such
regulatory arbitrage a constant risk.47
Once again, these problems are common to the regulation of
both systemic risk and consumer protection. Consumer protection
regulations must constantly adjust to changing products and
marketing that present new risks for consumers. And regulatory
efforts to limit one-sided transactions or ensure transparency are
virtually always subject to gaming by a motivated-if small-group of
firms and individuals that can make money by exploiting consumer
ignorance or mistakes. The same problems clearly afflict the
regulation of prudential and systemic risk, where regulators must try
to make sense of ever more complex financial products and
understand a vast and immensely complicated and interconnected
regulatory system.
Rationality need not be asymmetrically bounded to undermine
regulatory adaptation to market changes. Even deeply considered
and deliberate decisions guided by the most sophisticated
understandings of the economy may go badly wrong, as they did
leading up to the financial crisis.' Systemic and prudential risk
regulation are peculiarly susceptible to this problem. In recent
decades, advances in the modeling of financial risk were supposed to
greatly enhance our ability to understand and contain both firm-level
and systemic risk.49 That has not turned out so well.o One deep
45. See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECrIVES ON
REGULATION 13,20 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). We stress that this is just
a tendency. Plenty of very bright and dedicated persons enter government service because
it better fits their personal identity than the private sector.
46. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 332; Gerding, supra note 8, at 6.
47. See Jackson,supra note 4, at 332; Whitehead, supra note 20, at 3-8.
48. The Basel II capital requirements are a good example. The Basel II guidelines,
adopted by the leading industrial nations, used banks' own internal models to assess their
risk. Those internal models turned out to be untrustworthy. See Imad A. Moosa, Basel II
as a Casualty of the Global FinancialCrisis, 11 J. BANKING REG. 95, 95-96 (2010).
49. See SCoTr D. PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH
WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 27-46 (2010).
50. See id. at 262-91.
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problem with these models appears to be that they entertained an
overly tame understanding of the risk facing financial markets, either
by underestimating the likelihood of extreme financial events,s' or by
purporting to assign numerical probabilities to certain types of risks
that ultimately reflect truly immeasurable uncertainty.5 2 Either way,
the illusion of science created false confidence in economics
departments, business schools, Wall Street, and ultimately financial
regulators, who themselves adopted the same models used by the
academics and the regulated. Regulators also increasingly turned to
market participants' own risk models as the basis for regulationsBasel II capital requirements and credit rating agency ratings of assetbacked securities are key examples." These models were the work of
the best and the brightest engaged in trying to understand financial
markets, but even the best and the brightest can get things drastically
wrong.54
Adaptation in the consumer protection context is also
complicated by deep and fundamental limits to human understanding.
Many will agree that consumers and investors should be protected
from exploitation but free to make informed and fully considered
financial decisions. Nonetheless, potential consumer protection issues
often generate inaction because it is inherently difficult to know when
consumers and investors are being exploited and when they are
making genuine choices." Whereas some commentators invoke the
power of the market to argue that regulation can best promote
consumer welfare by increasing transparency, others argue that
51. BENOIT MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIs)BEHAVIOR OF
MARKETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD 230-44 (2004). See generally
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY

IMPROBABLE (2007) (exploring limitations in our knowledge of the world and the
consequent challenges of trying to predict the future).
52. See generally Claire A. Hill, JustificationNorms Under Uncertainty:A Preliminary
Inquiry, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2011) (discussing the need to justify
decisions even though probabilities cannot be assigned); TALEB, supra note 51 (explaining
how to cope with uncertainty).
53. Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 128-30
(2009).
54. This indeed was the case for the book that popularized the phrase "the best and
the brightest." See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST
(1972) (exploring the decision making that plunged the United States into the Vietnam
War).
55. See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance
Markets, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010) (exploring the extent to which various observed
"anomalies" in consumers' insurance decisions reflect genuine preferences or mistakes
and arguing that it is incredibly difficult to make this assessment in many cases).
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markets can promote exploitation in ways that are susceptible to
aggressive legal remedies. 6 Who is right depends largely on what
precisely is meant by consumer autonomy and welfare-issues that do
indeed stretch the limits of human knowledge, albeit in philosophical
rather than mathematical dimensions.
B.

Incentive Failures

An entire field of political science examines how the private
incentives of regulators and other government actors may conflict
with their pursuit of general social welfare." This section briefly
considers two prominent critiques that are particularly likely to
distort adaptation in financial regulation. First, public choice theory
suggests that a small number of people or corporations with similar
interests and a relatively large stake in regulatory outcomes will enjoy
comparative success organizing into effective lobbying groups. Such
groups are better able to overcome the free-rider problem than
groups that have large numbers of persons each of whom has a small
stake in the matter." This phenomenon can result in special interests
capturing regulators in the sense that they unduly influence
regulatory outcomes.' As the financial sector has become larger,
more profitable, and more concentrated, regulatory capture has
become a growing concern, although suspicion of the influence of
bankers goes back to the Founding Fathers.6 '

56. This tension is captured well in an excellent exchange between Richard Epstein
and Oren Bar-Gill. See Oren Bar-Gill, Exchange: The Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 801-02 (2007) (arguing that "welfare-enhancing
regulation is feasible" but that "[r]egulation should only be considered where such specific
evidence proves the existence, in the specific market, of a behavioral market failure that
generates significant welfare costs"); Richard A. Epstein, Exchange: The Neoclassical
Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 803-04 (2007) (discussing
concerns about legal interventions in consumer contracts and how regulation that
responds to consumer mistakes is more harmful than beneficial).
57. See generally JEFFREY S. BANKS & ERIC A. HANUSHEK, MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1995) (exploring the interactions between economic markets and politics).
58. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 3 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 7 (1971).
59. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACrION 53 (1965); see also
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 33-36 (1958) (discussing an
individual's rational decision-making process when placed in a collective group).
60. See Stigler, supra note 58, at 11-12.
61. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NExT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 14 (2010).
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The agency capture problem is both exemplified and exacerbated
by the revolving door. High-level financial regulators will frequently
be recruited from the ranks of industry and/or will go from their
government jobs into industry.62 Consider two of the most influential
treasury secretaries of recent decades, Robert Rubin and Henry
Paulson, both former leaders of Goldman Sachs. Even in the absence
of explicit corruption, regulators with such deep industry ties may
have a mindset that unduly favors the industry.63 They will tend to
think that what is good for the banks is good for the country, which is
sometimes true, but not always.
Regulatory capture will often blunt regulators' incentives to
adapt to newly emerging financial risks, as risk tends to generate
short-term profitability in the financial sphere.' This is particularly
true in the context of consumer protection, where regulated entities
have quite strong interests in deregulation, and consumers, the
beneficiaries of regulation, are a large, dispersed group of individuals,
each with a limited stake in regulatory outcomes.65 But, as the recent
financial crisis suggests, regulatory capture can also undermine
adaptive systemic risk regulation, as regulated industries have an
insufficient stake in systemic stability. Whereas individual firms can
often capture the benefits of risk taking, the costs can be externalized
to the economy as a whole, particularly in light of the prospect of
governmental bailouts.' This form of regulatory capture is a much
larger problem at the peak of the credit cycle, when the public is
usually rationally ignorant of financial regulation. By contrast, during
62. See generally Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door:
Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y 61, 62 (1992) (noting that "[t]he
empirical fact of the revolving door is beyond dispute," but arguing that it may not lead to
the type of regulatory capture that many claim).
63. Recently, this phenomenon has been termed "cognitive capture." See Gerald P.
O'Driscoll Jr., Op-Ed., An Economy of Liars, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2010, at A21
(describing " 'cognitive capture,' by which regulators become incapable of thinking in
terms other than that of the industry").
64. Of course, some newly emerging risks may jeopardize industry interests, in which
case regulatory capture can have the opposite effect of prompting overly aggressive
regulatory intervention in response to these changes.
65. See Barkow, supra note 10, at 64-65 (describing consumer protection as "a
prototypical example of asymmetrical interest group pressure opposing the general public
interest" because the industries that consumer protection regulators "are charged with
regulating are typically far more powerful and well financed than the consumers whose
interests they are charged with protecting").
66. See generally Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the "Subprime"
FinancialCrisis,60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 558 (2009) (describing the moral hazard created by
any bailout plan).
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times of financial crisis the power of lobbying groups can be offset by
the concentrated, if short-lived, attention of the public.
A second prominent critique of regulators' incentives-which
straightforwardly cuts across all forms of financial regulation-is
simply that principal-agent problems tend to result in limited
bureaucratic motivation to adapt to change.' Regulators are agents
who are supposed to act in the interests of their principal, the public.
Like all agents, though, they may be tempted to pursue their own
selfish interests by not working hard to accomplish this. Figuring out
what form financial regulation should take is hard work. In a sense,
the task is infinite, and regulators inevitably must draw a line at how
far they go in exploring options before acting. This is of course the
bounded rationality point discussed above. But regulators may not
choose to explore as far as they could and should, or as they would if
they really gave the public interest the weight it deserves. After all,
one of the attractions of lower-paying government jobs is that the
hours are a lot better than investment banking. At the same time, the
principal-agent problem may also take the form of regulators
advancing rules that increase their own power and prestige.' It is
possible that this agency cost may actually produce excessive
responsiveness to market change.
II. A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR CONTRARIANS

We define a regulatory contrarian as an individual or entity
possessing three distinctive features. First, a regulatory contrarian
must be at least partially affiliated with a particular regulatory body
but simultaneously enjoy meaningful independence from that
agency.6 9 That independence can result from the contrarian's budget,
staffing, appointment and removal process, or even institutional
culture. Second, a regulatory contrarian must possess persuasive
influence over its affiliated agency by virtue of its position, access to
media and officials, or speaking engagements and reports. At the
same time, regulatory contrarians must have limited, if any, actual
AND
JR.,
BUREAUCRACY
67. See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971) (developing a theory of bureaucratic behavior).

68. See id. at 38, 114.
69. Compare this to the proposals offered by Staszewski and by Bagley and Revesz,
which both suggest that independent entities such as the Congressional Budget Office,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), and GAO combat regulatory
inaction. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Within our framework, these entities
would be considered "quasi-contrarians" because they are not affiliated with any
particular regulatory entity.
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regulatory authority. Finally, regulatory contrarians must be tasked
with studying and identifying deficiencies and potential
improvements in the regulatory process, regulatory policy, and/or the
regulated market. Their focus should be entirely on regulatory policy
and the internal processes that produce that policy, whether they are
rulemaking or patterns of adjudication.o Entities or regulatory
strategies that meet only some of these conditions can be thought of
as "quasi-contrarian."
The key (but not only) job of contrarians is to counteract agency
inaction or ossification in the face of changing market risks.71 While
numerous mechanisms promote accountability with respect to
affirmative agency action (though contrarians can help here, too), few
tools combat the risk of excessive agency inaction.7 2 For instance,
judicial review of agency decision making is much more robust than
judicial review of agency inaction." Notice and comment rulemaking
is only required when rules are actually proposed. Legislative
oversight is most likely to be an effective check against affirmative
agency proposals or public and salient regulatory failures, rather than
the gradual failure to adapt to changing markets.74 To the extent that
super-agencies such as the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs ("OIRA") address agency inaction, that focus is heavily tilted
toward identifying existing regulations that should be relaxed rather

70. Some literature suggests that agencies tend to make policy through adjudication
rather than rulemaking because the former is subject to less robust judicial review. See
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 24-25
(1990).
71. This is a broader role than that envisioned by Staszewski as well as commentators
who promote more robust judicial review of agency inaction. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra
note 14, at 393. Those commentators are focused on an agency's specific decision not to
act. Id. ("Congress should enact a statute that creates a new, independent administrative
agency to oversee, monitor, and evaluate decisions by Executive Branch agencies not to
implement their existing statutory authority.").
72. See id.
73. "Although agency inaction is sometimes grounds for legal challenge, in practice it
is extremely difficult to drag an agency into court to defend its policymaking reticence."
Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1188 (2009); see also
Lisa Schultz Bressman, JudicialReview of Agency Inaction:An ArbitrarinessApproach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667-69 (2004) (explaining how the Court "insulate[d]" agency
inaction from judicial review through its decision in Heckler). For an illustrative case, see
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2003).
74. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big PictureApproach to PresidentialInfluence on Agency
Policy-Making,80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (1994).
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than identifying new areas that require regulation." And agency selfregulation usually takes the form of limiting agency discretion. 6 Not
only do most existing regulatory oversight mechanisms fail to address
the problem of regulatory inaction, but they in many ways exacerbate
it by increasing the costs of change."
Unlike existing accountability tools, regulatory contrarians may
be able to promote affirmative agency adaptation and action."
Although regulatory contrarians may well resist agency actions or
initiatives, they will tend to have less reason to focus on these issues
precisely because of the robust set of accountability tools that
affirmative regulatory actions already trigger. Contrarians-who will
themselves no doubt be influenced by political incentives-will have
less to gain by merely contributing to the cacophony of public
comments to a proposed rule. By contrast, their unique access to
information coupled with their persuasive authority should give them
a comparative advantage in emphasizing regulatory shortcomings and
inaction. Contrarians can be further encouraged to focus on agency
adaptation to market change by developing metrics that track how
often affirmative policy prescriptions originating from contrarians,
rather than their affiliated agencies, are adopted, although such
metrics may themselves cause problems."
Contrarians can promote adaptation by pointing out, and
advocating on behalf of, arguments and alternatives that are not
currently being considered within an agency or not receiving

75. See Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1355, 1399-1402 (2009). For further discussion of OIRA as a quasi-contrarian, see
infra Part III.E.
76. Indeed, Magill defines self-regulation in this way. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency
Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009) (arguing that agencies take
numerous measures to limit their own discretion even when they are not required to do so
by some source of authority).
77. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: CongressionalChoices About
Administrative Procedures,89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62-73 (1995); see also Susan RoseAckerman, Introduction to ECONOMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at xiii, xvii (Susan
Rose-Ackerman ed., 2009) (discussing how "[p]rocedures that limit the ability of an
agency to drift away from the aims of Congress may also mean that the agency is
unresponsive to technical innovations and new data").
78. Erik Gerding alludes to the same point. See Gerding, supra note 8, at 21-22
("Unlike the traditional checks and balances of political theory, which are designed to
curb political action (in order to prevent excessive concentration of power), however, the
checks described below also address the problem of policy inaction.").
79. See infra Part IV.B (developing this theme in further detail).
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adequate attention.' Contrarians should be constantly looking out for
persons who are speaking out against the prevailing received wisdom.
These arguments need not always involve substantive regulatory
decisions-just as often, regulatory contrarians may focus on
procedural deficiencies in how a particular viewpoint or position has
evolved within the regulatory apparatus. In all cases, these
perspectives should be informed by the contrarian's privileged access
to, and understanding of, the information, practices, and culture of its
affiliated regulator and market conditions. Moreover, contrarians
should build on their relationship with their affiliated agencies to
cultivate understanding and appreciation of alternative viewpoints."
Regulatory contrarians that raise awareness of alternative
arguments and issues may help to counteract the various cognitive
biases identified in Part I. Although there is clearly no single magic
bullet, an ever-growing literature suggests that various procedural
mechanisms can help to debias individuals.' To date, the literature
suggests that some of the most effective debiasing techniques involve
forcing decision makers to (1) take an outsider perspective on their
work, (2) consider the opposite outcome to which they are inclined to
take, (3) interact during the decision-making process with persons
with differing backgrounds and biases, and (4) publicly defend their
positions. Not coincidentally, regulatory contrarians are designed so
80. To limit intellectual hazard in financial institutions, Miller and Rosenfeld advocate
for policies that "introduce greater skepticism and independent judgment into the
processes by which firms in the financial sector evaluate information and make policies
related to risk." Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 41, at 836. We suggest that extending this
effort to regulators themselves would be advisable.
81. As Rachlinski and Farina note, "self-generatedagency use of external and internal
strategies for multiplying professional perspectives is highly desirable" because such
mechanisms "minimize[] defensiveness-thereby increasing policymakers' willingness to
take steps to improve their own decisional processes." Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24,
at 600. Similarly, some have argued that the liberalization of the rules governing standing
to sue was intended to prevent the "decisional perspective from which the agency in
question approached its problem [from becoming] too narrow" and ensure that "its
decisional frame ... be broadened, [by] exposure not only to additional information ...
but new decisional referents." Daniel J. Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and
AdministrativeJustice, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 42-43 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 200-01, 236 tbl.A1 (2006) (discussing both substantive and procedural
mechanisms that debias individuals); Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision
Making Be Improved? 3-4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-102,2008), available
at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdfl08-102.pdf (describing many strategies for debiasing
which in turn, improve decision making).
83. Milkman et al., supra note 82, at 5-6 (describing studies finding that forcing
individuals to take an outsider's view on their work and to consider the opposite outcome
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that they induce regulators to take precisely these types of steps in
their regulatory processes. Their independence and contrarian
orientation can prompt regulators to consider alternative viewpoints,
and their persuasive authority can lead regulators to anticipate the
possibility, or reality, that they will have to publicly defend their
positions. Because contrarians lack actual regulatory authority, they
can focus their energy on playing the role of devil's advocate.8 At the
same time, contrarians' affiliation with a specific agency can ensure
that those within that agency are consistently exposed to alternative
viewpoints. Of course, contrarians may develop their own preferred
viewpoints and not give adequate voice to a variety of points of view.
And even if the contrarians do give voice to many viewpoints, there is
no guarantee that regulators will listen to them. But effective
contrarians will hopefully be able to have some real influence on at
least some policies and problems.
Contrarians created by crisis legislation may be able to debias
regulators in another way by producing a sort of regulatory time-shift.
Legislatures are subject to many of the same political economy forces
as regulators, meaning that robust financial reform tends to be
possible only after large financial crises when public attention to the
issue can offset regulatory capture.85 However, legislators enacting
financial reform in the midst of a crisis must typically delegate
substantial responsibility to regulators for at least two reasons. First,
the midst of a recession or depression following a financial crisis is not
actually the best time to put stricter financial rules in place-such
rules are likely to constrict the provision of credit, and at such
moments we want credit to expand, not contract." Second, the precise
details of financial reform are often difficult to specify. However, by
the time regulators can implement crisis legislation, regulatory
capture and availability bias may take hold, resulting in the agency
successfully debiased the individuals); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 24, at 588
("Cognitive psychological research indicates that one of the best mechanisms for reducing
overconfident judgments is forcing oneself to consider alternatives and carefully review
arguments against one's own position.").
84. Indeed, the devil's advocate is a famous ancient example of a contrarian
institution.
85. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REv. 77, 92 (2003) (noting that
major changes in financial regulation are particularly likely during financial crises, with the
New Deal reforms being the most obvious and important example).
86. Congress recognized this point in the Dodd-Frank Act and directed agencies to
enact countercyclical capital requirements. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 616, 124 Stat. 1376, 1615-16 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)).
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adopting an overly pro-industry stance. That is a common pattern for
legislation in response to visible crises. Contrarians may be able to
disrupt this prospect by continually invoking the salient imagery of
the crisis, thus reminding regulators of the need for reform and
helping to keep them honest as they promulgate rules implementing
the crisis legislation.
Contrarians may also be able to help address some of the highlevel cognitive failures of regulation by serving as a sort of
intermediary between regulators and academics. Although copious
amounts of academic work across the disciplines bear on optimal
regulatory policy, regulators often have limited resources and
willingness to consider this research. 8 In part, this is attributable to
some of the biases described above, including optimism and
confirmatory bias. But it is also because academics and regulators
often communicate to different audiences using different language in
different forums." Contrarians-who are specifically tasked with
investigating alternative viewpoints-are an ideal mechanism for
helping regulators better leverage this work.
The incentive failures described in Part I may also be mitigated
by the efforts of an effective contrarian. Contrarians' access to
regulators and their persuasive influence means that they are well
positioned to serve as a whistle-blower and critic of regulatory
capture. Of course, contrarians may themselves be subject to the
threat of regulatory capture, but this is less likely than standard
regulatory capture. First, unlike regulators, there is less need for
contrarians to have work experience within the regulated industry.
This is because the position is less all-encompassing than that of a
regulator, with a contrarian able to focus his or her attention on a few
specific issues of concern. Not only does this limit the risk of the
revolving door into contrarian offices, but it also limits the revolving
door out of these offices: to the extent that contrarians have broadbased experience and expertise, it is much easier as a practical matter
to set strict limits on their ability to work in the regulated industry
after their tenure. Still, there is a danger if contrarians are too
disconnected from relevant experience, as they may not know enough
87. See id.
88. See Mitchell Weiss, Preface to NEW PERSPEcTIVES ON REGULATION 7, 7-8
(David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009) (emphasizing the disjunction between
academic knowledge about regulation and the theoretical knowledge actually employed
by regulators).
89. See id.
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to fully understand the industry. To alleviate the problem, contrarian
offices may often want to have some role for industry insiders as well.
Second, the risk of regulatory capture is limited by the fact that
contrarians have no (or limited) regulatory authority and must rely on
persuasion and public pressure to exert power. A paradox limits this
effect: if a contrarian office develops a reputation for successful
persuasion, that may make the office subject to more lobbying and
regulatory capture. We do not think that contrarians can fully counter
regulatory capture within agencies by any stretch of the imagination,
but we hope they can help.
Regulatory contrarians may also make regulators work harder
and more diligently. Knowing that their actions and decisions are
being scrutinized and critiqued by an independent entity with
privileged access to the agency and significant reputational capital can
increase regulators' incentives to adapt to new circumstances. 0 Not
only does this limit the risk of public shaming by the contrarian, but it
also increases the prospect of praise and encouragement."
Contrarians need not be curmudgeons.
To be sure, regulatory contrarians may resemble some other
mechanisms for promoting diverse viewpoints within agencies. In
particular, contrarians resemble minority members in multimember
commissions, particularly when a requirement exists that the
commission be balanced between competing political parties.' But
there are also important differences in these two institutional design
features, resulting in each having their own distinctive benefits and
weaknesses. Here we emphasize several benefits of contrarians
relative to multimember boards in promoting effective regulatory
adaptation. First, members of a commission may be less free than
contrarians to focus on issues that might not otherwise be on an
90. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 28 (1995) (exploring how OIRA review can improve regulation because
regulators know that their work will be scrutinized by an expert entity with privileged
access to information).
91. For one example of this, consider the award that NAIC consumer representatives
give annually to a state insurance regulator in recognition of their consumer protection
efforts. See ColoradoInsuranceCommissioner Recognizedfor ConsumerAdvocacy, INS. J.
(Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2010/10/21/114247.htm.
92. See generally Barkow, supra note 10, at 37-41 (discussing that minority members
act as a "built-in monitoring system" that prevents the committee from becoming too
polarized). Contrarians may also replicate some of the benefits of interagency lobbying
that others have described. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as
Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2231 (2005) (exploring how lobbying by outside
agencies can be effective counterweight against industry pressure).
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agency's agenda. Whereas board members must familiarize
themselves with all of the key issues before the commission,
contrarians are free to focus their energies on particular targeted
initiatives that may not currently be priorities within the agency.
Second, the dynamics among board members are likely to be
different than the dynamics of contrarians and their affiliated
regulators. Because they have the authority to vote on controversial
issues, minority board members will often seek compromise. By
contrast, contrarians are liberated from the practical necessity to
compromise (although compromise may often be strategically
beneficial) by virtue of the fact that they hold no actual power. Third,
disagreement among competing board members is often deeply
political." Contrarians, however, are meant to question assumptions
and receive wisdom irrespective of politics. Finally, the mechanisms
of dissent available to minority board members and contrarians differ.
Minority board members often issue formal dissents from agency
decisions, but they tend not to be oriented toward mobilizing public
opinion on the issue.94 Contrarians do not have a formal vote on
regulatory policies, but, precisely for this reason, they are likely to be
more adept at mobilizing public pressure through media contacts,
formal speaking engagements, and regular reports. After all,
persuasion is the primary tool available to contrarians to effect
change.
Contrarians, of course, will often be ineffective, particularly to
the extent that regulatory policy is influenced by strongly held
ideological beliefs or political incentives within a particular
administration or agency. Contrarians are inevitably doomed to
sometimes-nay, often-play the role of Cassandra. The hope is
simply that sometimes the agencies will actually heed the warnings, at
least up to a point. But we do think that wise governance requires
listening to those who disagree with you and at least sometimes
actually acting upon their insights. Wise governance does sometimes
happen, and we hope that contrarians can on occasion increase its
incidence.
93. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REv. 459, 461 (2008)
(characterizing minority party members of commissions as "ideological partisans
committed to the agenda of the opposition party").
94. See Barkow, supra note 10, at 41 (describing the ways in which minority members
of boards can dissent, which can, in turn, serve as a "fire alarm" that activates the scrutiny
of Congress and the public).
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III. EXISTING CONTRARIAN AND QUASI-CONTRARIAN MODELS
This Part offers a typology of regulatory contrarians. It describes
four different types of financial regulatory contrarians that currently
exist at the federal and state levels: ombudsman contrarians,
consumer representative contrarians, investigative contrarians, and
research contrarians. In doing so, Part III suggests that existing
contrarians can indeed promote affirmative agency adaptation as
described in Part II. In particular, ombudsmen and consumer
representatives can encourage regulatory initiatives by amplifying the
voice of consumers, pushing back against industry capture, and
overcoming confirmation bias and distortions in regulators' risk
perceptions. Similarly, investigative contrarians, such as inspectors
general, can counteract regulatory overconfidence and laziness while
research contrarians can bring together high-level academic theory
and policymaking. Whether these programs and institutions
accomplish these objectives efficiently or produce counteracting costs
is a topic for another day.
At the same time that it demonstrates some of the theory of
Parts I and II in action, this Part also reveals that the scope of existing
contrarian models is dramatically limited in one of two ways. In
particular, the first two types of contrarians-ombudsmen and
consumer representative contrarians-are both currently limited to
the consumer protection or service domain, despite the suggestions
above that contrarians can also be useful with respect to other forms
of financial regulation. By contrast, while the second two types of
contrarians-investigative and research contrarians-currently serve
an important role in a wide range of financial agencies, their
methodological emphasis and the scale of their jurisdiction
dramatically circumscribe these roles.
Finally, this Part also describes a category of "quasi-contrarians"
that do not satisfy the basic definition of a contrarian, but nonetheless
serve a similar function. Here, it focuses on the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO"), which is not affiliated with any
particular regulatory body and thus does not meet the first element of
the contrarian definition. This Part shows how this feature of the
GAO may limit its capacity to serve the core function of regulatory
contrarians, promoting regulatory adaptation to changing market
conditions.
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Ombudsman Contrarians

Several different contrarians have evolved out of ombudsman
offices. Although the term "ombudsman" is quite malleable, it
typically refers to an independent entity or person that is tasked with
responding to complaints concerning a specific government agency or
other type of institution.95 In many instances, of course, entities that
process complaints are in a privileged position to identify systemic
problems or concerns with the underlying entity. Patterns of
complaints, for instance, are often indicative of a larger problem in an
organization or institution.96 Indeed, many regulators use patterns of
consumer complaints about private firms to guide their regulatory
energies.97
Given their privileged position in identifying and understanding
institutional problems with the entities they are associated with,
ombudsmen often take on the role of a contrarian. 98 Such
ombudsmen are often described as "advocacy ombuds." 99 In some
cases, ombudsmen are specifically imbued with this authority. In
particular, some ombudsmen are formally authorized to (1)
proactively investigate issues that are not necessarily raised by a
specific complaint, (2) make specific recommendations for changes in
organizational or institutional structure, and (3) suggest changes to
the underlying agency's structure, organization, or authority in
published reports or testimony to an overseeing entity. 00 In other
instances, however, an ombudsman may act as a contrarian simply in
the course of attempting to investigate and resolve specific suits.0 O

95. See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 738.
96. See id. at 801-02.
97. See id. at 753.
98. See generally GINSBERG & KAISER, supra note 14, at 2-3 (noting that the federal
government has "multifarious forms of ombudsmen-like offices," some of which "examine
the agency's operations" and proactively evaluate its effectiveness in the relevant
communities); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Independent Advocacy Agencies Within Agencies: A
Survey of Federal Agency External Ombudsmen, Report to National Taxpayer Advocate,
at iv (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
99. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds
Offices, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 535, 549 (2002) (defining an advocate ombud as on
ombudsman that "serves as an advocate on behalf of a population that is designated in the
charter").
100. GINSBERG & KAISER, supra note 14, at 14.
101. See Lubbers, supra note 98, at v (finding that the national taxpayer advocate is an
"advocate ombudsman" within the definition used by the ABA). For instance, even
though the Financial Ombudsman Service ("FOS") in England purports not to have any
regulatory authority over the entities about which it receives complaints (private financial
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Perhaps the most well-known ombudsman contrarian is the
Taxpayer Advocate Service ("TAS") within the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS").'" Originally named the "Taxpayer Ombudsman,"
one of the central functions of the office is to help resolve taxpayer
complaints and answer taxpayer inquiries."o3 At the same time, TAS is
tasked with proposing changes in legislation and IRS administrative
practices designed to improve the IRS's relationship with taxpayers."
TAS uses several mechanisms to promote these changes through the
force of persuasion. 0 For instance, TAS issues an annual report to
Congress containing legislative recommendations and outlining the
key shortcomings of the IRS.1 0 The TAS is also an active participant
in the academic community, publishing its research in law reviews as
well as in its own reports and participating in research colloquia and
conferences.'07 Most importantly, the TAS relies on various informal,
"soft" approaches to influence IRS practice. As one frequent
commentator on the TAS puts it, the goal of the TAS is "to
continually present the taxpayer point of view to other
subcomponents within the agency as a balance, counterweight, or
firms), several different studies have found that, in practice, the FOS often exercises quasiregulatory authority. See Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 738-39.
102. See Bryan Camp, What Good Is the National Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAX
NOTES 1243, 1243 (March 8,2010).
103. Id. at 1248. There are nine criteria by which the TAS can take cases, though the
first seven are related to financial hardship. See id. They can also take cases on equity
grounds (meaning fairness issues or taxpayer rights are at stake) and on public policy
grounds, although the vast majority of these cases are hardship cases. In the first six
months of 2009, the TAS worked 101 "equity" cases and only 25 public policy cases,
compared with 134,000 hardship cases. Id.
104. Id.
105. The TAS is endowed with administrative authority in the form of Taxpayer
Advocate Directives, which authorize it to grant broad relief to taxpayers, improve
operation and procedure, and ensure equal treatment. 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation
1 70014 (2011). Consistent with this use of soft, persuasive power, the TAS has typically
refrained from using its formal authority to issue Taxpayer Advocate Directives. Nina
Olson, the long-time head of TAS, explained how the use of "taxpayer assistance orders[,]
...

the most obvious source of power[,] ...

[are] not going to be [what] changes the

system." Camp, supra note 102, at 1254. Instead, Olson explained that change would
ultimately come from her personnel acting as "persuaders" in conjunction with "the power
of the advocate service's annual report." Id. For these reasons, Olson has "focused the
TAS resources on engagement and persuasion" and embraced the notion that "the best
path to change is to make the case for change." Id.
106. See, e.g., TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
1-402, available at http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=217850,00.html.
107. See, e.g., Nina Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax
Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 7, 7 (2009); see also TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2011 OBJECrIVES, at vii (2010) [hereinafter FY OBJECTIVES] (listing
their many publications since 2001 addressing various issues with IRS collection efforts).
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check to insular thinking and the enforcement mentality that often
pervades inquisitorial systems.""o
The TAS's focus on counteracting regulatory inaction is evident
in its reports to Congress. For instance, the most recent report for
TAS objectives for fiscal year 2011 emphasizes IRS delays in
responding to taxpayers, issuing guidance, and incorporating into IRS
materials relevant information from recent court decisions. It
criticizes the IRS's lien-filing policies and practices, and it questions
the effectiveness of IRS initiatives to compromise with taxpayers
about their tax liability." Similarly, TAS's 2009 annual report to
Congress began by emphasizing the fact that the "IRS this year acted
on two longstanding issues that [the TAS has] identified several times
as most serious problems of taxpayers-identity theft and automated
levies on Social Security benefits."110 It also emphasized that the IRS
had just announced "that it would study the question of regulating
federal return preparers and present a report to the President and the
Secretary of the Treasury before year's end," an initiative that the
TAS has "recommended ...

since [its] 2002 Annual Report to

Congress, and reiterated and supplemented ... in successive
reports.""' The TAS's focus on promoting IRS adaptation is also
evident in its own performance metrics. For instance, it is developing
a trailing five-year metric to track its legislative recommendations and
the rate at which they have been enacted five years later. 112
In sum, the TAS uses both its significant persuasive authorityas reflected in its direct line of communication with Congress-and its
close relationship with the IRS to directly counteract regulatory
inaction and delay. The TAS does so by putting political pressure on
the IRS and by bringing an outsider perspective to the organization.
However, its role as an ombudsman contrarian is limited to issues that
involve the experiences of "consumers" of this regulation, that is,
taxpayers.

108. Camp, supra note 102, at 1249. Olson reinforced this when she suggested in one
interview that "the taxpayer advocate service wants to be a part of all IRS initiative
planning ... including ... compliance initiatives, examination initiatives, planning for tax
courses, and working with task forces looking into specific issues and programs like offers
in compromise." Id. at 1251.
109. See FY OBJECTIVES, supra note 107, at 2-20.
110. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 106, at v.
111. See id. at iv.
112. Id. at 327-37.
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Consumer Representative Contrarians

A second set of contrarians represents the public within the
context of regulatory proceedings. These contrarians are intimately
related to ombudsman contrarians in that they arise out of the same
intellectual underpinnings, dating back to the 1960s and '70s in
America, which emphasized public participation in lawmaking and
the empowerment of consumers."'3 However, these contrarians are
distinguishable from ombudsman contrarians in that they either do
not have a complaint-handling function or only interact with
individual members of the public as an adjunct to their primary role
of serving the public as a class. Rather, these contrarians are
empowered to represent public interests because they serve as a
"lawyer" or representative for consumers.
One example of this consumer representative contrarian is the
"Offices of Public Counsel" that are affiliated with several different
state administrative agencies. For instance, several states-including
California, Missouri, Florida, and Texas-have an Office of Public
Counsel that is affiliated with their public utilities regulators.1 14 Texas
113. See Public Participationin Federal Agency Proceedings: Hearings on S. 2715
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practiceand Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 1 (1976) (statement of William A. Blakey, Legislative Director, Commission
on Civil Rights).
114. The Florida Office of Public Counsel "provide[s] legal representation for the
people of the state in utility related matters in proceedings before the Florida Public
Service Commission, and in proceedings before counties." About the Office of Public
Counsel, FLA. OFFICE OF PUB. COUNSEL, http://floridaopc.gov/about.cfm (last visited
Apr. 26, 2011). The Florida legislature created it by statute in 1974. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 350.061 (West 1998). Similarly, the Missouri Office of the Public Counsel
represents the interests of the public and utility customers in proceedings before
the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) and in appeals in the courts. The
PSC regulates the rates and services of investor-owned electric, natural gas,
telephone, water, sewer and steam heat utilities. The Office of the Public Counsel
is independent from the PSC and has a separate budget and staff.
MO. OFFICE OF THE PUB. COUNSEL, http://www.mo-opc.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
The Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel states its mission as follows:
to provide representation to Texas residential and small commercial telephone
and electric utility consumers in utility proceedings that come before the Public
Utility Commission of Texas (PUC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and in state and
federal courts to ensure that utility services are available to these ratepayers at just
and reasonable rates in an increasingly competitive environment.
About Us, TEx. OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. COUNSEL, http://www.opc.state.tx.us/about%20us
.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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also has an Office of Public Insurance Counsel ("OPIC") that was
designated as an independent agency charged with representing
Texas consumers as a class regarding insurance-related issues.' For
many of these offices, the primary (if not sole) task is to represent
consumer interests in administrative proceedings, particularly those
involving ratemaking.116 Unlike the TAS, they therefore tend not to
fulfill the role of counteracting regulatory inaction. However, at least
one public counsel, OPIC, is statutorily empowered to recommend
rule changes or legislative enactments."' Although OPIC has used
that authority sparingly, it recently waged a prolonged and ultimately
successful campaign to ban discretionary clauses in life, health, and
disability policies."'
There are at least two potential reasons why OPIC has not done
more to promote regulatory adaptation. First, like the commissioner
of the Texas Insurance Department, the public insurance counsel,
who heads OPIC, is appointed by the governor. 119 As a result, these
two entities are likely to have similar views regarding insurance
regulation. In any event, they have strong political incentives not to
criticize each other publicly. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the OPIC evaluates itself based largely on metrics that are not related
to promoting regulatory adaptation. Because their primary goal is to
advocate for consumers in rate hearings, rulemaking procedures, and
other forums,120 they evaluate their success by counting the
percentage of rate and rulemaking hearings attended and the
percentage of rates and rules changed as a result of OPIC
115. OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, SELF-EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2007), available
at http://www.opic.state.tx.us/docs/487_sunset selfevaluation.pdf. The Texas legislature
created the OPIC. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 501 (West 2009).
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. In some cases, these offices are also
tasked with improving consumer information, though they usually undertake this task
independently of any affiliated regulatory body. For instance, the Texas OPIC: (1)
produces a consumer bill of rights for personal lines of insurance; (2) develops a report
card for HMOs that is made available to the public; and (3) maintains a unique consumer
information mechanism to facilitate consumer review of individual insurers' policy forms.
OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FISCAL YEARS
2011-2015 PERIOD 5 (2010), available at http://www.opic.state.tx.us/docs/657_2010
_strategicplan-sans.def.pdf. It performs each of these functions entirely independently of
the Texas Insurance Department. Id.
117. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 501.153 (West 2009) (granting the OPIC the power to
appear, intervene, or initiate under certain circumstances); id. § 501.155 (empowering
OPIC to recommend legislation).
118. See OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, supra note 116, at 5.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
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participation. 121 They also measure their strategy results by counting
not only the number of such hearings attended, but also the number
of proposed rule and rate filings analyzed.122 They finally measure
their efficiency by looking at the amount spent per hearing
attended.1" Whether or not these metrics properly set priorities for
OPIC, they clearly do not incentivize OPIC to focus on promoting the
Texas Insurance Department's capacity to adapt to changing market
conditions.
Another example of consumer representative contrarians is the
Funded Consumer Liaison program of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC").124 Unlike most contrarians, the
NAIC Consumer Liaison program is not a single organization, but
instead consists of approximately eighteen individuals who are
selected from applications solicited from the general public on an
annual basis." Individual consumer liaisons are typically academics
or employees of public interest organizations, and their tenure as
consumer representatives ranges from a single year to over a
decade.'2 6 Consumer liaisons are reimbursed for the expenses they
incur in attending triannual meetings of the NAIC, are afforded free
access to NAIC resources and conference calls, and are provided with
formal training and materials.'2 7 More importantly, consumer liaisons
are provided with privileged access to regulators and a designated

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The NAIC is the organization of state insurance regulators from all fifty states,
Washington, D.C., and the five U.S. territories. See generally Susan Randall, Insurance
Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 629-34 (1999) (discussing the
NAIC's historical development).
125. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, NAIC Accepting Applications for
2011 Consumer Liaison Representatives (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.naic.org/Releases/
2010_docs/2011_consumerrepresentatives.htm
(announcing the NAIC's soliciting
applications for the 2011 program); 2011 NAIC Funded Consumer Representatives, NAT'L
Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer-participationfunded
reps.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (listing eighteen members).
126. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, supra note 125 (indicating that the
consumer representatives consist of six academics, ten employees of nonprofit public
interest organizations, and one unaffiliated individual).
127. See Consumer Participationat NAIC, NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, http://www
.naic.org/consumer participation.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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public forum for presenting on issues of their choosing at each NAIC
meeting.'28
Because the NAIC consumer program is comprised of
individuals with disparate interests and expertise, its contributions to
the insurance regulatory apparatus are both more diverse and harder
to characterize than most other contrarians.129 But like the TAS, and
to some extent OPIC, consumer liaisons often focus their energies on
overcoming regulatory inaction, delay, or mistakes. For instance, one
recent campaign of NAIC consumer representatives promoted
transparency in personal lines insurance policies."o Regulators had
not addressed this issue for several decades, in large part because it
did not generate consumer complaints or headlines. Yet NAIC
consumer representatives, based both on empirical research and their
experiences in the marketplace, recognized that the issue was
pressing: in recent years, this lack of transparency has caused several
major national carriers to dramatically reduce the scope of their
coverage without consumers or regulators recognizing this fact.13' In
response to sustained pressure from NAIC consumer representatives,
the NAIC is now actively investigating comprehensive reform to
improve insurance policy transparency. 3 2 Similarly, NAIC consumer
representatives have devoted substantial energy in recent years to
encouraging regulators to scrutinize insurers' use of credit scores in

128. See Committees & Activities, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, http://www.naic.org/
committeesconliaison.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (stating the mission of the
NAIC/Consumer Liaison Committee).
129. Consumer liaisons present on a wide range of issues at the public meetings where
they control the agenda, almost all of which advocate for specific action by regulators on a
new initiative or on an issue already before the NAIC. They similarly follow these issues
of interest across the NAIC organization, participating in conference calls, providing
testimony at hearings, supplying written testimony, and collaborating on public letters or
press releases. In some cases, representatives form themselves into organized "teams" of
representatives that collaborate on particular issues, whereas in other cases consumer
liaisons fail to coordinate their activities or even clash with one another about substantive
positions and strategic priorities. Because their participation in the consumer liaison
program is not compensated and tangential to their primary employment, the time
commitment of individual consumer liaisons varies dramatically.
130. Schwarcz, supra note 33 (manuscript at 6) (describing the formation of an
"Insurance Policy Transparency Working Group" to study issues raised by personal lines
insurance).
131. See generally id. (inspecting several types and carriers of insurance policies and
discussing the lack of transparency therein).
132. See Mark Ruquet, NAIC to Review Personal Lines Contract Transparency,
PROPERTYCASUALTY36 0 0 (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.propertycasualty360.comI/2010/10/
21/naic-to-review-personal-lines-contract-transparency--.
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pricing policies.133 Although the practice is long standing, producing
both confirmation bias and limited political pressures, consumer
representatives emphasized the new impacts that the practice had in
the midst of the financial crisis. In particular, they argued that those
who received subprime loans were disproportionately seeing their
credit scores decrease for reasons having little to do with their true
insurance risks." While it is too early to judge how these advocacy
efforts will play out, they clearly have had a substantial impact in
prompting affirmative scrutiny of a practice that otherwise would
likely have been ignored.135
Ultimately, then, existing consumer representative contrarians
have enjoyed some success in promoting regulatory adaptation to
changing market conditions. But like ombudsman contrarians,
consumer representative contrarians are limited in their subject
matter to issues that directly implicate the welfare of consumers. They
are a natural means of fighting regulatory capture and improving
consumer protection regulation, but they do less to address other
forms of bias or to improve prudential or systemic risk regulation.
C.

Investigative Contrarians

The inspector general ("IG") offices that many agencies
maintain represent a third brand of regulatory contrarian. At the
federal level, IGs became a substantial element of public agencies
with the Inspector General Act of 1978, which created IG offices in
twelve federal agencies to accompany two preexisting IG offices. 13 6
133. See generally CHI CHI Wu & BIRNY BIRNBAUM, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTrR.,
COSTING CONSUMERS BILLIONS AND
CREDIT SCORING AND INSURANCE:
PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC RACIAL DIVIDE (2007), available at http://www
.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/InsuranceScoring.pdf (calling for a ban on the use of
credit scoring in insurance, but noting that many states permit it).
134. See Phil Gusman, NAIC Presses Insurers over Credit Scoring Impact,
PROPERTYCASUALTY360 0 (June 15, 2009), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2009/06/
15/naic-presses-insurers-over-credit-score-impact-.
135. See id. Of course, these are just a limited number of examples where consumer
representatives have promoted more affirmative scrutiny of regulatory practices and
inaction. Another notable example is the work of several consumer representatives to
more proactively study and craft readable and comprehensible disclosures. See generally
Brenda Cude, Insurance Disclosures: An Effective Mechanism to Increase Consumers'
Market Power?, 24 J. INS. REG. 57 (2005) (studying participants' reactions to disclosures
and suggesting improvements); Brenda Cude, Insurance Disclosures: Implications for
Insurance Regulators of Recent Research, 26 J. INS. REG. 1, 3 (2007) (reviewing briefly a
few articles on the subject of improving insurance disclosures).
136. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006) (creating additional IG
offices); id. § 12 (specifying the federal agencies with newly created IG offices). In 2008,
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Since that time, IGs have spread throughout the federal bureaucracy,
with sixty-nine agencies now having independent IG offices.' 7 The
primary purposes of IG offices are to detect and prevent fraud and
abuse and to promote efficiency and effectiveness in government
offices. 13 8 In contrast to other contrarians, IGs are not intended or
designed to impact substantive agency policy. Consistent with this
orientation, IGs are ostensibly objective and nonpartisan. They are
supposedly appointed "without regard to political affiliation and
solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting,
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations."139 Some, however, question the
independence of some IG offices,14 and the enactment of reform in
2008 was largely intended to address concerns about the politicization
of IGs' offices.' 4 '
Inspectors general are endowed with various tools to accomplish
their prescribed goals. The most important of these tools is a broad
authority to audit and investigate its associated agency.142 IGs are also
required to issue semiannual reports to Congress reviewing
deficiencies in the administration of their agencies' programs and
operations and recommending improvements.143 At the same time,
the Inspector General Reform Act amended this act, creating the Counsel of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, which serves as a central repository for
information and coordination among the various IG offices. Inspector General Reform
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, sec. 7, § 11, 122 Stat. 4302, 4305-06 (2008) (codified at 5
U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11 (West Supp. 2010)).
137. Marcia G. Madsen et al., Oversight-This Is Not a Commercial Relationship, in
GOVERNMENT CONTRACrS 2010: ENTERING INTO A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
U.S. 379, 384-85 (E. Sanderson Hoe & Marcia G. Madsen co-chairs, 2010).
138. See generally Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General
Act in the Federal Government:A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473,
474 (1985) (stating the mission of IG offices); Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight
in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243
(1999) (discussing the creation, purpose, and duties of IG offices).
139. Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector General
Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027,2029 (1998) (quoting relevant statutory language).
140. See generally William S. Fields & Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and Functional
Influences on the Objectivity of the Inspector General Audit Process, 2 GEO. MASON
INDEP. L. REV. 97 (1993) (considering factors that undermine the objectivity of certain IG
offices).
141. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, §§ 1-2, 122 Stat.
4302, 4302 (2008) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 (West Supp. 2010)) ("An Act to amend
the Inspector General Act of 1978 to enhance the independence of the Inspectors
General[.]"); H.R. REP. No. 110-354, at 8 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1795,
1796.
142. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a) (2006).
143. See id. § 2(3).
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IGs are explicitly prohibited from interfering in the agency's
"program operating responsibilities"1 " or investigating issues
involving "regulatory compliance," as opposed to the actions of their
agency, its employees, and recipients of federal funds. 145 Their
primary tools of audit and investigation, along with their limited
mandate, ensure that IGs' orientation is entirely retrospective,
focusing on prior failings of internal operations within the agency
rather than potential future problems that may not have manifested
themselves.
Despite their investigative, nonpartisan, and procedural
orientation, IGs are similar to other contrarians in that they
counteract regulatory inaction and delay. This is because IGs'
authority explicitly extends to the efficiency and effectiveness of a
regulator's internal operations. One prominent example helps
demonstrate the point. The inspector general of the SEC released an
almost 500-page report in August 2009, detailing the agency's various
missteps in failing to act on a decade's worth of credible, significant
evidence it had received indicating that Bernard Madoff was
operating a Ponzi scheme.146 In large part on the basis of this report,
the SEC instituted broad-ranging reforms in its operations, including,
but not limited to, "[r]evitalizing the Enforcement Division,
[r]evamping the handling of complaints and tips, [e]ncouraging
greater cooperation by 'insiders,' [e]nhancing safeguards for
investors' assets ... [and] [i]mproving risk assessment capabilities. "147
Although the SEC would no doubt have instituted reforms in the
wake of the Madoff scandal, the IG ultimately helped shape the
nature and scope of those reforms by taking a critical eye to the
factors that contributed to the SEC's failure. Similarly, while the
threat of internal investigation clearly did not prevent the SEC from
overlooking Madoff's fraud, it can be expected that the agencies such
144. Id. § 9(a).
145. Burlington N. R.R. v. Office of Inspector Gen., R.R. Ret. Bd., 983 F.2d 631, 641
(5th Cir. 1993); see Inspector GeneralAuthority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13
Op. O.L.C. 54, 63 (1989); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Inspector General Systems, in 3
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:40 (3d ed. 2010).
146. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO
UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 47-50 (2009), available at
http://cO403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/2000/2009_0831_SEC
Madoff.pdf (considering the causes of the SEC's failure to discover Madoff's illegal
activities).
147. The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last modified
Oct. 8, 2010).
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as the SEC overlook less given the risk of internal investigation ex
post.
At the same time, some have argued that IGs are less effective
than they could be at counteracting regulatory delay and inaction
because they focus excessively on "compliance monitoring," or strict
conformity with specific rules and regulations.14 Often, however,
promoting effective regulation also requires establishing positive
incentives for achieving desired outcomes ("performance
accountability") and promoting agency technologies and expertise
("capacity building accountability").14 9 These criticisms may help to
explain why the IG did nothing to prevent the SEC from ignoring
Madoff when intervention would have actually been useful. Others,
however, question whether IGs are better situated than other types of
entities to focus on these alternative forms of accountability.5 0
D. Research Contrarians

A fourth type of potential regulatory contrarian can best be
labeled a "research contrarian" in that it essentially brings "in house"
various academics or researchers who are afforded some degree of
autonomy to study issues relevant to the regulatory body. Often,
potential research contrarians do not satisfy the third element of the
contrarian definition. These contrarians produce research that is
merely meant to provide regulators with information relevant to their
regulatory functions rather than to focus on potential problems in
existing regulatory processes and/or policies."' For instance, the
NAIC maintains a Center for Insurance Policy and Research that
describes its mission as "leverag[ing] the resources of several NAIC
departments and academicians to support the collection of
information and analysis for use by state and federal officials,
agencies, and policymakers."' 52 Similarly, various Federal Reserve
148. PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE
SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 224 (1993).

149. Id. at 220.
150. William S. Fields, The Enigma of BureaucraticAccountability, 43 CATH. U. L.
REv. 505,518-19 (1994).
151. Entities such as the Fed's Economic Research Departments may also fall short of
the contrarian definition in other ways. For instance, they enjoy limited mechanisms for
exerting their persuasive authority. In many ways, it seems, their primary such tool is to
publish their research in academic journals and speak at academic conferences. Although
individuals within these departments may have more substantial authority via their
informal connections with top Fed officials, the extent of this authority is hard to gauge.
152. About the CIPR, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr-about
.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
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banks maintain entire "Economic Research Departments" that are
partially intended to gather and produce information that is used by
the Federal Open Market Committee and Board of Governors in
forming national monetary policy.s 3
However, research contrarians can, and occasionally do, produce
independent research that is specifically aimed at promoting
innovation and evolution in regulation. Consider once again the
Economic Research Departments of Federal Reserve banks.
Economists in these departments have produced a substantial amount
of research in recent years studying ways to reform systemic risk
regulation. For example, one recent paper produced in such a
department proposes the construction of a database that monitors
fund flows and financial instruments to get a more accurate picture of
systemic risk, allowing vulnerabilities to be spotted far sooner.'54
Other research originating in these departments focuses on
potentially unaddressed but problematic market practices, such as
whether certain commission programs offered to bank employees
tended to increase default rates.' Yet another paper analyzes
popular models used by the Federal Reserve in predicting wage and
inflationary pressures and finds that the models are inaccurate
because they don't incorporate the ways in which the Federal
Reserve's economic and policy changes themselves impact wages and
153. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 10 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/pflpdf/pf_.pdf ("Boards of directors of the Reserve Banks provide the Federal
Reserve System with a wealth of information on economic conditions in virtually every
corner of the nation. This information is used by the FOMC and the Board of Governors
in reaching major decisions about monetary policy."); About Economic Research, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF DALL., http://www.dallasfed.org/research/about.html (last visited Apr.
26, 2011) ("The Dallas Fed's Economic Research Department provides information and
analysis to the Board of Governors, the Bank's president and the board of directors to
assist them in implementing effective monetary policy.... Providing timely, insightful
analysis of current economic conditions is the department's primary goal.").
154. Leonard Nakamura, Durable Financial Regulation: Monitoring Financial
Instruments as a Counterpartto Regulating FinancialInstitutions 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Phila. Research Dep't, Working Paper No. 10-22, 2010), available at http://www
.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wplO-22.pdf ("I
here advocate a system for monitoring financial instruments as a complement to the
regulation of financial institutions. If a system of financial regulation is to be durable, it
must evolve with the development of new institutions and instruments. A main purpose of
this paper is to begin a dialogue on an intellectual framework for the analysis of systemic
risk data collection.").
155. Sumit Agarwal & Faye H. Wang, Perverse Incentives at the Banks? Evidence from
a Natural Experiment 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 09-08, 2009),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedhwp/wp-09-08.html.
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prices.'16 Thus, research contrarians within the Fed clearly do focus on
promoting regulatory adaptation to changing market conditions.
Much less information is available about what mechanisms exist for
them to persuade Fed regulators to act upon their research findings.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, in particular,
illustrates both the potential for research contrarians to promote
agency adaptation and the difficulties of designing successful
contrarian strategies. The Minneapolis Fed was one of the first
regional Federal Reserve banks to build a serious research
department. Working with the University of Minnesota economics
department, the Minneapolis Fed played a major role in developing
the rational expectations approach to macroeconomics.1s This
approach contained major intellectual breakthroughs and, with its
promarket tendencies, served as a useful counter to the proregulation
tendencies that characterized the Keynesianism that dominated both
academia and policy in the 1960s. It helped promote financial market
deregulation at a time when regulation may well have gone too far.
However, it continued to promote deregulation after that movement
may well itself have gone too far. The strong free-market culture of
the Minneapolis Fed and the Minnesota economics department was
self-reinforcing and drew upon strong forces in the DNA of
economics as an intellectual discipline."5 s However, when views that
had once been contrarian become intellectually and politically
dominant, this particular agency entity was not able to reverse course
and start criticizing the very ideas that it helped nurture.159 Thus,
while research contrarians provide a promising avenue for addressing
some of the forms of regulatory bias identified here, and especially

156. Benjamin D. Keen & Evan F. Koenig, How Robust Are Popular Models of
Nominal Frictions? 22-23 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall. Econ. Research Dep't, Working
Paper No. 0903, 2009), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/papers/2009/wp
0903.pdf.
157. See PRESTON J. MILLER, THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS REVOLUTION:
READINGS FROM THE FRONT LINE, at xv (1994).
158. For an interesting online debate between the new president of the Minneapolis
Federal Reserve, a "freshwater" economist who did research for the Fed for years before
becoming its president, and Brad Delong, a prominent "saltwater" Keynesian economist,
see Bradford DeLong, The State of Modern Cutting Edge Macro: Narayana Kocherlakota
Leaves Me Puzzled, BRAD DELONG'S GRASPING REALITY WITH BOTH HANDS (Sept. 20,
2009, 12:13 PM), http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/09/the-state-of-modern-cutting-edgemacro-narayana-kocherlakota-leaves-me-puzzled.html.
159. See Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 41, at 827-28 (arguing that the idea of the
"great moderation" became so dominant in the Fed that "it is unlikely that anyone in the
Fed's research department would have taken issue with the concept").
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for addressing problems in regulating systemic risk, they are far from
a panacea.
E. Quasi-contrarians

A quasi-contrarian is simply an entity that resembles a contrarian
but does not meet one of the formal elements of the definition that
we lay out above. The most obvious, and most important, example of
a quasi-contrarian is the GAO. The GAO describes itself as an
"independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress" to
"investigate[] how the federal government spends taxpayer
dollars."160 The GAO ensures that federal funds are being spent
efficiently and effectively, investigates allegations of illegal and
improper activities, reports on how well government programs and
policies are meeting their objectives, performs policy analyses, and
outlines options for congressional consideration."6 ' Although the
GAO resembles a contrarian, it does not meet the definition of a
contrarian because it is not affiliated with a specific regulatory entity.
Rather, the GAO was put under the control of Congress in 1946.162
The GAO is, of course, an immensely valuable organization. But
its capacity to counteract regulatory inaction and delay may be
limited by its generalist orientation and formal relationship to
Congress rather than a specific agency. Although it is authorized to
evaluate regulatory programs on its own initiatives, 63 this proactive
type of activity has gradually been supplanted in recent years by the
GAO's increasing focus on responding to Congressional requests or
statutory mandates." This orientation may limit the GAO's capacity
to identify and counteract agency inaction in the face of market
change. 165

160. About GAO, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/about
/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
161. Id.
162. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 136, 60 Stat. 812,
832 (repealed 1979).
163. 31 U.S.C. §717(b) (2006).
164. In fiscal year 1999, 95% of the GAO's work was the result of congressional
requests (72%) or mandates (23%). Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2311, 2371 n.262 (2006). This trend has
continued-in fiscal year 2009, 95% of the GAO's engagement resources were devoted to
work requested or mandated by Congress. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO10-234SP, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 16 (2009).
165. At the same time, though, the breadth of the requests to which the GAO responds
may, in fact, allow it to counteract regulatory inaction. For example, the GAO appears to
have made a number of recommendations that may have helped to avert the recent
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Similar arguments can be made about OIRA, another quasicontrarian that is not affiliated with any particular agency and that
enjoys substantial regulatory authority. OIRA's broad mandate
arguably limits its capacity to promote proactive regulation in specific
agencies.'" It may also undermine the subject-matter expertise of
individual agencies.167 Others have argued that the scope of OIRA's
authority produces enhanced risk of regulatory capture.'6 This
contrasts with the point made above that true contrarians may face
more limited threat of capture precisely because they enjoy limited
authority. 6
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY CONTRARIANS AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION

Parts II and III suggest that regulatory contrarians can, and
occasionally do, modestly promote regulatory adaptation to market
change. At the same time, they suggest that existing contrarians
remain quite limited in important ways. Ombudsmen and consumer
representatives are limited to the consumer protection function, while
investigative and research contrarians are limited through their
methodological emphases or limits on their authority. As a result,
contrarians have historically had little influence on important
segments of financial regulation. Perhaps most importantly, their
substantive and methodological limitations mean that they have not
generally operated in the domain of prudential and systemic risk. 170
financial crisis, at least to some extent. Between 2004 and 2007, the GAO issued four
different reports criticizing the overlapping authority of the four agencies regulating
financial institutions and the potential this created for gaps in regulatory oversight.
RICHARD J. HILLMAN, U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-1049T, RECENT
CRISIS REAFFIRMS THE NEED TO OVERHAUL THE U.S. REGULATORY SYSTEM 7-8
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091049t.pdf.
166. See Farber,supranote 75, at 1399-1402 (establishing the failure to be proactive).
167. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 281 (1991); Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at
the Practiceof PresidentialControl, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 97 (2006).
168. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 14, at 1306-08 (arguing that OIRA is just as
subject to regulatory capture as are ordinary agencies, and perhaps even more so);
Barkow, supra note 10, at 34-37.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
170. The financial crisis reveals that some forms of consumer abuse may increase
systemic risk. For that reason, stronger consumer protection may address systemic risk.
See generally Cox, supra note 7, at 279 (arguing that if consumer advocates' and
regulators' warnings were heeded, then the subprime mortgage crisis might have been
avoided).
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This Part transitions from the history of regulatory contrarians to
their future. Dodd-Frank"' is the largest and most comprehensive
reform of the American system of financial regulation since the New
Deal. The Act broadly embraces and expands upon regulatory
contrarians in financial regulation. It creates a number of new
contrarian institutions within many federal agencies, enhances some
existing contrarian institutions, and contains various quasi-contrarian
elements. These changes expand regulatory contrarians squarely into
the domain of systemic and prudential risk regulation. They also
broaden some of the methodological restrictions of contrarians,
directing "investigative" contrarians to be more proactive and
"academic" contrarians to be more policy oriented. Interestingly, at
least one newly minted financial regulatory contrarian arose outside
of Dodd-Frank, on the initiative of the SEC.
Not only are contrarians a pervasive feature of financial reform,
but their effectiveness is critical for the success of reform writ large.
As alluded to at the outset of this Article, a central goal of financial
reform is to make financial regulation more adaptive to market
changes impacting both systemic risk and consumer protection
threats. In other words, it attempts to create a framework that does
not simply address the particular causes of the past crisis, but that
encourages agencies to anticipate future consumer protection and
systemic risks. Because financial reform is a response to a deep
financial crisis, the politics that temporarily made possible increased
financial regulation are not likely to last, even though most of the
details of reform will ultimately be spelled out by regulators in the
coming years. Moreover, the Act tackles almost all of the major
interest groups within the financial system and thus faces all the
public choice problems that entails. In short, as an attempt at
comprehensive reform of financial regulation in the face of the
greatest financial crisis in the lifetime of most living Americans, it
faces all of the obstacles we have identified (and then some).
Section A of this Part describes the various regulatory contrarian
and quasi-contrarian tools that Dodd-Frank and associated financial
reforms embrace in an effort to devise more adaptive financial
regulation. Section B then offers some preliminary thoughts on the

171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
2011)).
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lessons that long-standing regulatory contrarians provide for the new
generation of contrarians emerging out of financial reform.
A.

Regulatory Contrariansin FinancialReform

Dodd-Frank establishes several new offices that meet our
definition of a regulatory contrarian. First, the Act establishes several
new contrarians that straddle the line between research contrarians
and investigative contrarians. The most important of these may be the
Office of Financial Research ("OFR"). 72 This office, established as
an independent entity within the Treasury Department, does not
enjoy any rulemaking authority but is instead charged with
identifying potential sources of systemic risk for the benefit of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (which is discussed more fully
below)." The OFR thus extends contrarians' role firmly into the
domain of systemic risk regulation. Like classical investigative
contrarians, the OFR enjoys wide-ranging authority to collect data. It
can explicitly collect data from financial companies.174 While the Act
does not give the OFR explicit authority to collect data from other
agencies, it does have authority to standardize the data that they
collect and report to the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which
itself has clear authority to collect information from agencies.' 75
Despite this investigative power, its methodological orientation is
more like classical research contrarians: it is directed to identify
sources of systemic risk, promote research on systemic risk, and
evaluate the health of the regulated marketplace.176 Indeed, its
creation was championed by an academic, John Liechty at
Pennsylvania State University, who saw that federal financial

172. § 152(a), 124 Stat. at 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(a)).
173. § 153(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1415 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5343(c)(1)).
174. § 154(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1416-17 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5344(b)(1)(B)).
175. § 153(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1415 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5343(c)(2));
§ 112(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1395 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(2)(A)).
176. The Research and Analysis Center of the Office is charged
(B) to monitor, investigate, and report on changes in systemwide risk levels and
patterns to the Council and Congress; (C) to conduct, coordinate, and sponsor
research to support and improve regulation of financial entities and markets; (D)
to evaluate and report on stress tests or other stability-related evaluations of
financial entities overseen by the member agencies ... (G) to conduct studies and
provide advice on the impact of policies related to systemic risk; and (H) to
promote best practices for financial risk management.
§ 154(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1417-18 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.

§ 5344(c)(1)).
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regulators' data could be mined using modern computer and
analytical techniques to identify sources of systemic risk.177
The new Federal Insurance Office71 is another research
contrarian that enjoys some features of an investigative contrarian.
The primary role of the Federal Insurance Office is "to monitor all
aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or gaps
in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis
in the insurance industry or the United States financial system."17 9
Not only does this mission further rely on contrarians to identify
systemic risk, but it also creates a federal contrarian that is designed
to influence the state-based regulatory system. Like the OFR, the
Federal Insurance Office enjoys broad data-gathering powers
traditionally associated with investigative contrarians. In particular, it
is authorized to require any insurer to submit virtually any data that it
determines is relevant to its mission.s 0 Its regulatory functions are
limited to a number of narrow domains, such as assisting the Treasury
Department in administering the Terrorism Insurance Program,
coordinating federal efforts to develop international insurance policy,
and determining whether state insurance measures are preempted by
international agreements.' 1
The new Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation
("Division") in the SEC is yet another new research contrarian,
though it was created by the SEC itself rather than Dodd-Frank.
According to the press release announcing the Division, it is designed
to "provide the Commission with sophisticated analysis that
integrates economic, financial, and legal disciplines" with a focus on
"three broad areas: risk and economic analysis; strategic research; and
financial innovation."18 2 The initial director of the new Division was
Henry Hu, a well-known finance professor who warned of potential
177. Carrick Mollenkamp, How a Street Watchdog Got Its Bite, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2010, at C1. Bankers at Morgan Stanley also helped push for the OFR. Id. For some
biographical information on Liechty, see Directory: John Liechty, PA. STATE UNIV.
SMEAL COLL. OF BuS., http://php.smeal.psu.edu/smealdirbio/displayBio.php?t-user-id
=jcll2 (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
178. Sec. 502(a), § 313(a), 124 Stat. at 1580 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 313(a)).
179. Id.
180. Sec. 502(a), § 313(e)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1581-82 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 313(e)(2)(A)).
181. Sec. 502(a), § 313(c)(1)(D)-(F), 124 Stat. at 1580-81 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 313(c)(1)(D)-(F)).
182. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces New Division of Risk,
Strategy, and Financial Innovation (Sept. 16, 2009), availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2009/2009-199.htm.
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risks from derivatives many years before the crisis.' Hu, who
recently stepped down after setting up the Division, was brought in to
help the SEC "really rethink risk management and help [the SEC]
attract different skill sets to the agency as we try to remake the
organization." 84
The Act also extends the reach of contrarians by expanding the
role of classical investigative contrarians. As noted in Part III, all of
the major financial regulatory agencies already had their own IG
offices. But Dodd-Frank importantly expands the role of these
contrarians, creating a Council of Inspectors General on Financial
Oversight composed of the inspectors general of the major financial
regulatory agencies.' As above, this contrarian organization is
charged with examining sources of systemic risk, a significant step
away from the traditional focus of IG offices on fraud and
inefficiency. The Council of Inspectors General will meet at least
quarterly, "with a focus on concerns that may apply to the broader
financial sector and ways to improve financial oversight."186 It must
report on its findings annually to Congress and to the Financial
Stability Oversight Council.' 7
Dodd-Frank also expands the reach of investigative contrarians
into several self-regulatory bodies. First, the Act not only established
privately organized derivatives-clearing organizations that will be
closely overseen by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") or the SEC,'" but it requires these organizations to have
chief compliance officers that operate as investigative contrarians.s 9
These officers are required to review the organization's compliance
with soundness principles set forth in the Act, resolve conflicts of
interest, establish procedures for remediating noncompliance, and
prepare annual reports to the CFTC or SEC concerning regulatory
compliance.1 90 Second, the Act requires credit rating agencies to have
compliance officers who submit reports to the SEC on the
organization's compliance with the securities laws.' 9' Like classical
183.
184.
C1.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Kara Scannell, At SEC, ScholarWho Saw It Coming, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at
§ 989E(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1946 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11).
§ 989E(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1946 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11).
§ 989E(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1946-47 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 11).
Sec. 725(b), § 5b(g), 124 Stat. at 1686 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-1(g)).
Sec. 725(b), § 5b(i), 124 Stat. at 1686-87 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-1(i)).
Sec. 725(b), § 5b(i)(3), 124 Stat. at 1687 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-1(i)(3)).
§ 932(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1872-73 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(c)).
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ombudsmen, however, these investigative contrarians must handle
complaints regarding the organization.
Although Dodd-Frank's central strategy for promoting consumer
protection is through its establishment of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), the Act relies on consumer
representative contrarians as well. For instance, the Act establishes
an Investor Advisory Committee within the SEC that is composed of
the investor advocate (described below), representatives of state
securities commissions, representatives of senior citizens, and ten to
twenty members appointed to represent individual and institutional
investors.19 2 The committee is directed to advise and consult the SEC
on protecting investor interests, promoting investor confidence, and
Like consumer
ensuring the integrity of the marketplace."
representative contrarians generally, the committee thus gives voice
to outside representatives of investors within the agency. Similarly,
the CFPB itself contains a Consumer Advisory Board composed of
outside consumer interest advocates.194 Note that these consumer
representative contrarians work within agencies that are themselves
created to protect certain consumers and investors. Various
regulatory obstacles-particularly capture-threaten to divert the
agency from that protective function, and the contrarians are
intended to keep the agencies focused on their intended goals.195
Dodd-Frank also establishes some new ombudsman contrarians.
First, it creates an Office of the Investor Advocate within the SEC.196
The new office is charged with assisting investors in resolving
problems they have with the SEC, identifying areas in which investors
would benefit from rule changes, and analyzing the impact of
proposed rules.'" The investor advocate cannot otherwise be
employed by the SEC for two years before or five years after serving
in that position."' The investor advocate largely parallels the TAS in
the IRS, another ombudsman contrarian: both charge agency
192. Sec. 911, § 39(b), 124 Stat. at 1822-23 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78pp(b)).
193. Sec. 911, § 39(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1822 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78pp(a)(2)).
194. § 1014(b), 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5494(b)).
195. Also worth noting in the role of consumer representative contrarians are the
Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion that are created within each financial regulatory
agency. § 342(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1541 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5452(a)(1)(A)). These
offices shall assess how agency policies and programs affect women and minorities.
§ 342(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1541 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5452(b)(2)).
196. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(1), 124 Stat. at 1830 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(1)).
197. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(4), 124 Stat. at 1831 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(4)).
198. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1831 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(g)(2)(C)).
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employees who regularly field investor complaints to look after the
interests of those investors by making recommendations without
themselves setting rules. Interestingly, the SEC investor advocate will
appoint a specific ombudsman who will help retail investors resolve
problems with the SEC and review procedures to encourage persons
to present questions to the investor advocate. 99 The Act also creates
a Private Education Loan Ombudsman within the new CFPB.2 " This
office will receive and attempt to resolve complaints from education
loan borrowers and make recommendations to the relevant
regulators.2 0 1
We thus see examples of all four categories of contrarians either
newly created or strengthened within Dodd-Frank. Many of these
contrarians blur some of the traditional contrarian categories
described in Part III, and the majority of them focus on systemic risk,
an area far afield from the traditional domain of contrarians.
The Act also includes several quasi-contrarian measures:
protecting whistleblowers is one such measure. Insiders, both within
agencies and within regulated businesses, often have crucial
information that, if known to regulators, would help guide them.
Encouraging them to make such information public is an important
way to get more information to regulatory agencies. Dodd-Frank
provides for awards to whistleblowers who provide original
information concerning securities law violations.' The Act also
forbids employers from retaliating against such whistleblowers.2 03
More interestingly and originally, the Act creates a hotline for SEC
employees to suggest improvements or report mismanagement. 20 The
hotline will be maintained by an old contrarian: the SEC's inspector
general.20 5
Another new quasi-contrarian institution, noted above, is the
Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"). The FSOC is
composed of the heads of the major federal financial regulatory
agencies .21 It includes as nonvoting members the directors of the
199. Sec. 919D, § 4(g)(8)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1840 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78d(g)(8)(B)(ii)).
200. § 1035(a), 124 Stat. at 2009 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5535(a)).
201. § 1035(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2010 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5535(c)(1)).
202. Sec. 922(a), § 21F(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1)).
203. Sec. 922(a), § 21F(h)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1845-46 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)).
204. Sec. 966, § 4D(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1912 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-4(a)(1)).
205. Id.
206. § 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1392-93 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(1)).
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OFR and the Federal Insurance Office. 21 The FSOC must meet at
least quarterly and is charged with considering potential threats to
financial stability.20 8 This is not a separate contrarian body, but
instead consists of the heads of regulatory agencies. It does, however,
force those agency heads to meet regularly to consider possible
problems with the existing regulatory system. They will be able to
pool information and compare their varying perspectives. This will
bring together persons with some diversity of perspective2 in a
setting where they are charged with considering threats to stability.
The Act builds in several mechanisms to prod the FSOC to do this
job effectively. The FSOC must report regularly to Congress. 2 10 The
GAO will regularly audit the FSOC,2 11 and the FSOC includes
various contrarians as nonvoting members.2 12
In sum, the Dodd-Frank Act uses contrarian and quasicontrarian institutions widely. We cannot think of another piece of
federal legislation that uses such techniques so pervasively. The new
contrarian entities can be slotted within the four existing categories
identified in this Article. However, they push the existing bounds of
those categories beyond their current limits. There is a much greater
focus on systemic risk than seen before, with one entire entity (the
OFR) focused on it and others enlisted in the fight. IG offices are
given a substantive role that they have not had before. Research
contrarians are given authority they have not previously enjoyed and
more specific, policy-oriented missions. Quasi-contrarian strategies,
such as those involving the FSOC that combine with old contrarians
like the inspectors general and new contrarians like the OFR and the
Federal Insurance Office, push agencies yet further. These new
entities and strategies will surely not be a cure-all for the pervasive
problems they address. Cognitive biases, capture, agency
aggrandizement, and ossification will be widely present as the Act is
implemented over time. But one hopes that the new institutions and
strategies identified here will significantly reduce these problems. The
207. § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1393 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(2)).
208. § 111(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 1394 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(e)(1)); § 112(a)(1),
124 Stat. at 1394 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(1)).
209. For instance, the director of the CFPB is likely to have a more proconsumer
perspective than most other FSOC members.
210. § 112(a)(2)(N), 124 Stat. at 1396 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a)(2)(N)).
211. § 122(a), 124 Stat. at 1411 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5332(a)).
212. § 111(b)(2)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 1393 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321(b)(2)(A)(B)) (listing the director of the OFR and director of the Federal Insurance Office as
nonvoting members of the FSOC).
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next section considers various lessons that can be gleaned from past
contrarians to help increase the chances of this outcome.
B.

PreliminaryLessons for Future Regulatory Contrarians

Long-standing regulatory contrarians offer a broad range of
potential insights for the new generation of contrarians created in the
wake of financial reform. First, the experience of the Minneapolis Fed
research contrarian offers some potential insights on how to structure
regulatory contrarians so that they maintain a contrarian orientation
in the long run. Recall that this institution seemingly adopted a
contrarian orientation when it was first developed that helped to
nudge federal banking policy away from excessive regulation.
Unfortunately, this substantive, deregulatory position became a
defining feature of the Minneapolis Fed, leading it to maintain this
perspective well past the point when it was a minority viewpoint
within the Fed. The contrarian thus ultimately ended up as more of a
cheerleader for the deregulatory policies of the Federal Reserve
under Alan Greenspan than as a skeptical, contrarian institution. This
risk seems particularly grave for research contrarians because their
contrarian orientation is neither tethered to a particular constituency
nor inherently apolitical (as is arguably true with investigative
contrarians).
Research contrarians such as the OFR; the Federal Insurance
Office; and the SEC's Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial
Innovation may be able to avoid a similar fate by changing their
leadership whenever the leadership of their associated regulatory
entity changes. Of course, the goal would be for the new leadership of
the research contrarian to have different perspectives than the new
leadership of the affiliated agency, so this would only make sense if
there were a way to allow the losing political party to select the
contrarian leadership. Approaches such as that employed in Texas,
where the governor appoints both the head of OPIC and the
commissioner of the Insurance Department, should thus be
avoided.213 Replacing the leadership of research contrarians on a
periodic basis, or simply infusing research contrarians with staff or
visitors from divergent methodological and philosophical
perspectives, are two sensible, less radical plans. Alternatively, some
new contrarians might follow the model of the NAIC Consumer
Liaison program, soliciting applications from the public for time213. See OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNSEL, supra note 116, at 5, 16.
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bound positions that afford them substantial autonomy in pushing
their own particularized contrarian perspective.2 14
A second lesson for the new generation of financial regulatory
contrarians concerns the use of performance metrics. If feasible, welldesigned performance metrics not only improve agency
accountability, but they also shape the objectives of the organization
being evaluated. 2 15 Developing such metrics may be difficult for
contrarians, however, because while their outputs, such as audits or
reports, are measurable, their progress in promoting regulatory
adaptation is likely difficult to measure and controlled predominantly

by their affiliated agency. 216 Some contrarians, such as OPIC,217
consequently resort to performance metrics that are easy to track and
meet, but fail to develop "measurable goals for the results or
outcomes that their programs are intended to achieve." 218 Poorly
designed metrics like these can create perverse incentives. The GAO
faced this problem in the late 1990s, when its performance metrics
were process oriented, not outcome oriented, measuring easy-tocount items such as the number of reports issued or the number of
hearings attended.219 They responded by developing several new
214. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
215. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-1167T, TRANSFORMATION,
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES: STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S. 8-9 (2003) [hereinafter WALKER], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031167t.pdf ("Measuring the right things is vitally
important because you manage what you measure and measurements ultimately drive
basic organizational and individual behaviors."); Ken S. Cavalluzzo & Christopher D.
Ittner, Implementing Performance Measurement Innovations: Evidence from Government,
29 ACCr., ORGS. & SOC'Y 243, 259-60 (2004) (studying the statistically significant
correlation between performance measurement development and the accountability of
government agencies).
216. This is particularly true for ombudsman contrarians, who handle consumer
complaints but depend upon their affiliated agency to address underlying causes of those
complaints, and research contrarians, who lack the authority to implement any of their
suggestions. See BERYL A. RADIN, CHALLENGING THE PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT:
ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 42-44 (2006) (discussing

the difficulties faced in designing performance metrics by agencies that either cannot
measure or do not control the outcomes of their efforts).
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GGD-99-16, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
MEASURING PROGRAM RESULTS THAT ARE UNDER LIMITED FEDERAL CONTROL 1

(1998); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and
Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1760 (2008) (describing the tendency among
federal agencies to design performance metrics comprised of "a set of optimistic statistics
designed to reassure the agency's overseers that they are doing fine, rather than a frank
discussion of the real causes of regulatory failure").
219. See WALKER, supra note 215, at 9.
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outcome-oriented performance metrics, including the number of
recommendations made, the percentage of reports with
recommendations, and the percentage of its recommendations made
four years ago that had been implemented.22 0
These metrics encourage contrarians to focus both on making
realistic recommendations and on aggressively lobbying to have those
recommendations implemented. This has certainly been the case for
the GAO. In 1998, 69% of recommendations from 1994 had been
implemented, while only 33% of written products issued in 1998
contained recommendations.22 1 These numbers have steadily
improved, and in 2008, 83% of recommendations from four years ago
had been implemented, and 66% of new written products contained
recommendations.2 22 The TAS has adopted similar metrics, and it too
has seemingly enjoyed substantial success in promoting IRS
adaptation in recent years. 223 However, even these more sophisticated
metrics could have perverse incentives. For instance, they may
encourage a contrarian to make a large number of small and
uncontroversial recommendations rather than recommendations that
are likely to face serious resistance, but are more important and
valuable. So, using performance metrics is worth considering, but only
with very careful deliberation. It may be that performance metrics are
more appropriate for some contrarians than others-they may work
better for consumer representatives, for instance, than for research
contrarians focused on complex problems surrounding systemic risk.
A third lesson for future contrarians is the importance of using a
combination of formal and "soft" approaches to influence the
underlying regulator. As recounted earlier, the TAS has utilized these
different types of persuasive elements to great success in the recent
220. Id. at 8-9.
221. Id. at 11.
222. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-234SP, PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 23, available at http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d10234sp.pdf. The fact that thirty-four percent of new products did not contain
recommendations demonstrates that while performance metrics can be valuable, they
have limitations; regulatory contrarians should recognize where statistical achievements
may undermine their core mission. "[W]e set our target [for the percentage of new
products containing recommendations] again in fiscal year 2010 at 60 percent because we
recognize that our products do not always include recommendations and that the Congress
and agencies often find informational reports just as useful as those that contain
recommendations." Id. at 32.
223. The TAS, an ombudsman organization, will begin in 2011 to measure the
percentage on recommendations from four years ago that have been implemented. See FY
OBJECTIVES, supra note 107, at VI-3.
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past.224 By involving its own personnel with daily regulatory activities,
it has developed both legitimacy within the IRS as well as a deep
appreciation of the difficulties facing the IRS. At the same time, the
TAS has strategically used the power of its formal reports to
Congress in combination with this soft power to push otherwise
difficult reforms at the IRS.
A final lesson concerns how to preserve the contrarian's
independence from its affiliated agency. Because of a contrarian's
role in studying, investigating, or criticizing an affiliated executive
agency, independence from that agency is essential to a contrarian's
proper functioning.225 Even the appearance that a contrarian is under
the influence or control of its affiliated executive agency may
undermine its power to persuade and thus its effectiveness.226 There
are a number of ways a contrarian's independence can be threatened.
Some of these include the appointment process for the director, the
ability to remove that director, control over the contrarian's budget,
lack of an independent staff or legal counsel, and a unique form of
agency capture, whereby the contrarian's employees come from the
ranks of the affiliated agency.22 7
Existing contrarians offer various potential lessons for how best
to safeguard the independence of the new generation of contrarians.
For instance, as noted earlier, one of the primary goals of the
Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 was to enhance the
224. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
109 (2009), availableat http://www.irs.gov/publirs-utl/09_tasarcvol_2.pdf(explaining that
"[a]n ombudsman must be free from bias or conflicts of interest .... At a minimum, the
ombudsman should be independent from management or other administrative obligations
or functions because the more an ombudsman must rely on his or her parent organization,
the more difficult it is to operate impartially"); Fields & Robinson, supra note 140, at 108
(arguing that "independence and objectivity ... are central to the Inspector Generals' role
in that they bear directly upon the Inspector Generals' ability to produce results that are
both reliable and relevant to decision makers").
226. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RL 30349, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 12, 15 (2008), availableat
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misclRL30349.pdf
(discussing the GAO's view
that
"independence from regulation by executive branch entities ... was seen as necessary to
remove even the appearance of a conflict of interest, as GAO had increased oversight of
these agencies and the federal personnel system") (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. See NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 225, at 112-14 (describing various
ways that an ombudsman agency can be compromised by its affiliated agency); see also
AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS
OFFICES 2-4 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/
leadership/2004/dj/115.authcheckdam.pdf (outlining the requirements for effective
ombuds operation).
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independence of IGs. Some of the mechanisms it relies upon to
accomplish this include requiring prior written explanations to
Congress regarding the removal or transfer of an IG, facilitating IG
access to independent legal advice, and establishing a Council of
Inspectors General that itself polices the independence of IGs.m
Similarly, the TAS's independence was buttressed with the
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, which provided that the
national taxpayer advocate reports only to the IRS commissioner and
cannot have worked for the IRS for two years before appointment.
Under the statute, the TAS itself is to be separate from the IRS with
respect to management control, facilities, and career opportunities.22 9
To be sure, some of these lessons appear to have already
influenced the structure of the next generation of contrarians created
by Dodd-Frank. For instance, Dodd-Frank occasionally prevents
executive agencies from interfering with a contrarian by removing its
director,20 changing its duties,231 cutting its budget, 2 reviewing its
reports to Congress,233 or controlling its hiring or firing.2 34 But these
protections appear to be lacking in some cases. For example, while
independent budgets were provided for the OFR235 and the CFPB,2 36
there is no such provision for the Office of the Investor Advocate.23 '
These limitations have already hindered the progress of contrarians,
with the SEC recently announcing that it is indefinitely delaying the
creation and staffing of both the Office of Investor Advocate and the

228. Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, sec. 7(a), § 11(a), 122
Stat. 4302, 4306 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 3 (West Supp. 2010)); sec. 6(a), § 3(g), 122
Stat. at 4305 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 3); sec. 3(a), § 3(b), 122 Stat. at 4302 (codified
at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 3 § 3); H.R. REP. No. 110-354, at 8 (2007), reprinted in 2008
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1795,1796.
229. See Camp, supranote 102, at 1248.
230. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 152(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(b)(1) (West Supp.
2011)) (stating that the director of the OFR is to be appointed by the president).
231. § 152(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(b)(5)).
232. § 155, 124 Stat. at 1418-19 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5345); § 1017(a)(2), 124 Stat.
at 1975-76 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497(a)(2)).
233. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(6)(B)(iii), 124 Stat. at 1832 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 78d(g)(6)(B)(iii)).
234. § 152(d), 124 Stat. at 1413-14 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5342(d)); see, e.g.,
Lubbers, supra note 98 (manuscript at 61-64) (reviewing the various provisions that give
the TAS a high degree of independence); KAISER, supra note 226, at 23 (outlining the
protections afforded the comptroller general of the GAO against removal from office).
235. See § 155(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1419 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5345(b)(1)).
236. See § 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1975 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5497(a)(2)(C)).
237. See § 915, 124 Stat. at 1830-32 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 78d).
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Whistleblower Office due to "budget uncertainty."'s Also concerning
is the lack of protections against director removal. This could be a
particular problem where the contrarian's director reports directly to
the head of the affiliated agency, such as the investor advocate, who is
appointed by, and reports directly to, the chairman of the SEC." As
the new contrarians grow and evolve, the lessons learned from
existing contrarians should be used to buttress structural
independence from affiliated agencies.
CONCLUSION

Would all of these contrarians in Dodd-Frank have prevented
the financial crisis from occurring? We doubt it, but that is in part
because we fight the hypothetical-creating such contrarians would
have gone against the very trends that led to the crisis. This financial
crisis occurred after the longest period of relative financial peace in
American history. The last great financial crisis in the United States
was the Great Depression. The 1970s had some turbulence, but no
full-blown crisis, and the '80s had the savings and loan fiasco, but that
affected a much more limited part of the financial system. Such
relative peace for so long is bound to eventually lead to both private
actors and regulators letting down their guard.2' Few saw the need
for contrarians. Even if they had been in place, eventually they would
have become Cassandras impotently decrying the excessive move to
deregulation.
Now that a crisis has occurred, we are more attuned to the need
for such contrarians. If we institutionalize them, there is a chance that
they may delay the next crisis and help lessen its severity when it does
arrive. We have seen the large number of contrarian and quasicontrarian entities and strategies that the Dodd-Frank Act creates or
strengthens. Some of these are quite narrow and focused, while others
are broader. Some focus on consumer or investor protection, while
others focus on systemic risk. The sheer number and variety of new
entities provide many different paths for those concerned about
emerging risks to make themselves heard. We think there is quite a
238. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act-Dates To Be Determined, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N (Dec. 2,2010), http://www.sec
.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dates to_be_determined.shtml.
239. Sec. 915, § 4(g)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1830-31 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.

§ 78d(g)(2)(A)).
240. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 5, 68, 176, 21920,270 (1986); McDonnell, supra note 22, at 38.
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good chance that as new financial risks emerge, someone somewhere
within the various financial regulatory agencies will sound an alarm.
The chances of that occurring are even greater to the extent that
some of the new contrarians, especially research contrarians such as
the Office of Financial Research or the Division of Risk, Strategy,
and Financial Innovation (not a part of Dodd-Frank, but also a
response to the crisis), adopt a model of broad academic inquiry and
debate that brings in scholars and others with a wide range of views to
discuss questions with the agencies and regulators.
The much harder question is whether those raising the right
alarms will manage to get the appropriate regulators to listen and act
on their concerns. Only time will answer that question. Surely the
answer in part will be that some on-target alarms will be ignored.
When the next crisis does hit, there will be stories of people within
some of the contrarian entities discussed here who identified some
problem that helped cause the new crisis, but who were unable to get
their regulators to listen and act on their warnings. But with some
luck, hard work, and wisdom, it may also be that some contrarians do
identify real problems and manage to get regulators to act to address
them. These probably will not generate as many stories-crises
averted are less salient than crises that occur after warnings that fall
on deaf ears. Cassandras ignored and vindicated will cry out, "I told
you so," while Cassandras heeded will often generate people annoyed
by the regulations they inspired while no one feels the benefits from a
crisis averted. Even so, these contrarians, old and new, have promise
to do some good in nudging regulators to better respond to changing
risks as financial markets rapidly evolve.

